THE CHINA-EUROPE AXIS NICOS E. DEVLETOGLOU

THE NATION

AUGUST 16, 1975 *50 cents*

Oliphant, Washington Star

EXERCISE IN GENTILITY **ALAN WOLFE**

The Rockefeller CIA Report

Joseph P. Fried

URBAN DEVELOPMENT: THE ROOF FALLS IN

Daniel Ben-Horin

IS RAPE A SEX CRIME?

AMNESTY INTERNA[illegible] on TORTURE

David Glanz

The Sherrod Library
Periodicals Dept.
E.Tennessee St. Univ
Johnson City, Tn. 376

8-77

ETSU LIBRARY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LETTERS

news from out there

Santa Barbara, Calif.
I've just finished reading "Latin America: The Hole in the News" by Richard O'Mara [*The Nation*, July 5] and I want you to know how much I appreciate that article and others before it. Being an internationalist I'm perturbed at being assailed from all sides by a flood of words on what's happening in America, while I must search hard for articles about the rest of the world. . . .Thanks for informing me about Brazilian elections, Venezuelan economics, Danish socialism, and so on. . . . *Peter Lee Boberg*

semantic

Swanton, Vt.
To the best of my knowledge, Goddard College is located in Plain*field*, Vt., not Plain*view* as written by James Rowen ["The Office-Holding Activists," *The Nation*, July 5]. Mr. Rowen's article is excellent, but if he has visited the beautiful state of Vermont, he should know that the views are spectacular—never plain!
Avis C. Fleischer

a prisoner writes

I am a resident of the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in Lucasville, Ohio. I am writing to you in the hope of having this letter printed in your magazine.

I've been locked up behind these prison walls for some time and I've lost all contact with my family and friends. My only purpose in writing to you is that I would like to meet people and make new friends. This is my only means of relating to the outside world.

I am 25 years old, 6ft. 1in. tall, 180 pounds, light-brown hair, blue eyes, easygoing, open-minded and broad-minded, very understanding, also a man that has made a mistake and has learned from his foolish mistakes the hard way but a way I'll never forget. I would like to hear from anyone who wishes to correspond with a man behind these prison walls. I'll answer all letters with an honest reply. . . . *David S. Ward, No. 137-960*
P.O.Box 787, Lucasville, Ohio 45648

Martin Hall

Los Angeles, Calif.
Martin Hall, who died June 5 in Los Angeles, was known to progressives throughout the United States and in other countries as a veteran anti-Fascist of unswerving commitment. He fought for fifty-five years against political repression, beginning with the first Fascist coup in March 1920 in his native Germany when he was 19 years old. From those early days, Martin Hall carried the ideas of participatory democracy into his native high school and college organizations. After Hitler came to power in 1933 he covered, as a journalist in great peril, the historic Reichstag Fire trial of Dimitrov.

After several years in the anti-Nazi underground he was forced to leave for France and England and in 1937 came to the United States. His career here was as a lecturer and writer with the American Friends Service Committee and the Anti-Defamation League.

I came to know Martin during his twenty-seven years of active membership in the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles of which I was the minister. We shared in encounters with the House Committee on Un-American Activities, about which he wrote for *The Nation*, *Frontier* and the *York Gazette*. He thrice served on our board of trustees at the church, and chaired the campaign to defeat the California church loyalty oath devised by Assemblyman Harold Levering, a struggle which won a historic victory in the U.S. Supreme Court in 1958.

Martin also worked valiantly during the McCarthy era to keep the Unitarian Fellowship for Social Justice an independent organization for its lay and clerical members. He chafed at the frequent compromises on controversial issues in church movements and sought, continuously, to teach the hard lessons of resistance to fascism to many inexperienced Americans.

(Continued on page 116)

EDITORIALS

Foreign Watergates

Enough has been disclosed of recent weeks to confirm the existence of what Philip Agee in his book on the CIA (*Inside the Company*) has characterized as "a whole dark world of foreign Watergates covering the past thirty years." These foreign Watergates, only now beginning to emerge, threaten to dwarf in significance the domestic scandal of the same name.

The current disclosures divide into two categories. One has to do with the extent to which major American corporations—Exxon, Gulf Oil, Ashland, Mobil, United Brands, Northrop and others—have paid out vast tax-deductible sums to bribe foreign politicians and officials, soften up the opposition press, influence political parties and buy legislative favors and other concessions. Operations of this kind—the documentation is extensive—have been carried out in Asia, the Middle East, Central and South America, Europe and Africa. In most instances the payments resulted in tangible advantages of one kind or another to the corporate donors, but the effect was also to subvert, influence, and frustrate established parliamentary processes and political activities in the various countries where such payments were made—in much the same way that Watergate corrupted and distorted domestic politics. To some extent payments of this kind must have been known to Washington officials, if not instigated or approved by them. For example, more than $200 million was paid to foreign agents by American corporations engaged in the overseas arms traffic. In more than one instance the negotiating agents for American arms manufacturers have been former U.S. officers or CIA officials. Payments of this magnitude must, therefore, have been known to the Pentagon and the CIA. American corporations have also provided cover for CIA agents, who in turn paid out large sums for various clandestine purposes. So it is not so much a question of business corporations having acted on their own to secure particular corporate advantages, as it is of corporations collaborating with government in carrying out policies to advance the overseas expansion of American business interests, these being thought of as identical with the national interest. If a particular regime stood in the way of such unfettered expansion it invited subversion.

The second wave of disclosures relates to the CIA and kindred operations aimed at gaining essentially the same objectives. Agee's book gives an excellent insight into the extent to which the agency intervened in the affairs of Latin American regimes as part of the ill-fated attempt to isolate Cuba which is now drawing to a close. Taylor Branch and George Crile III have shown in a recent article in *Harper's* ("The Kennedy Vendetta," August) that a four-year covert war was carried on in pursuit of this goal at an estimated cost of $100 million a year. In part this stupid and arrogant policy was motivated by a desire to punish the Castro regime for Washington's humiliation over the Bay of Pigs fiasco, but the basic objective was to shore up American corporate interests throughout Central and South America. Large sums were used to bribe Latin American politicians and officials and to influence political

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PENNY LERNOUX

The Nation's newly appointed correspondent for Latin America received her B.A. degree in journalism and Spanish from the University of Southern California, where she was city editor of the *Daily Trojan.*

After a stint as a local reporter, she joined the USIA, serving in Bogota and Rio de Janeiro. In 1964 she was employed by Copley News Service in Caracas, where she opened the agency's first bureau, later being transferred to Buenos Aires, and in 1970 to Bogota. She has since covered South America all the way to Tierra del Fuego.

Her honors include: Phi Beta Kappa, an Inter American Press Association scholarship for postgraduate study in Chile, two Overseas Press Club citations, the IAPA-Tom Wallace award and a citation from the Latin American Studies Association. Besides *The Nation*, she has contributed to *Newsweek, Newsday* and other publications.

parties and the press. Millions in AID and CIA funds were given to the Belgian Jesuit Roger Vekemans for his program to fight the rising left-wing tide in Chile (see *National Catholic Reporter*, August 1). This far-ranging campaign of intervention and subversion—in such sharp contrast to the lofty stated aims of the Good Neighbor Policy and the Alliance for Progress—was conducted in close collaboration with American corporate interests. Agee points out, for example, that First National City Bank cooperated in some of the CIA's zanier operations, and the role of ITT in Chile is well known. The career of Kermit Roosevelt, fifteen years with the CIA and thereafter a well-paid consultant for such companies as Gulf and Northrop, serves to indicate the close links existing between U.S. multinational corporations and the military-intelligence establishment.

What has been disclosed thus far suggests the existence of a pattern of intimate collaboration between multinational corporations, the military and the intelligence establishment in pursuit of overseas policies and objectives which Congress has never explicitly approved and of which it has not had full knowledge. Indeed, Richard Helms, former head of the CIA, when testifying before Congressional committees, denied under oath that the agency tried to prevent Allende from coming to power in Chile. So the two Congressional probes of the CIA now underway are engaged in an inquiry no less important than that conducted by Sen. Sam Ervin and his colleagues. What should emerge from these probes, but probably will not, is a blueprint or pattern which will convincingly demonstrate how government and private corporate power have collaborated to achieve aims and purposes never sanctioned by the Congress and of which its members were largely ignorant.

Alger Hiss, Esq.

On August 5th, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that Alger Hiss be readmitted to the bar of that state, where he received his first license to practice in 1930. Robert DiGiacomo, counsel for the newly formed Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, brought the matter to Judge Reardon, who declined to rule and referred the matter to the full court. Mr. Hiss was represented by counsel John Groden; Mr. DiGiacomo, as a party to the proceedings, presented opposing arguments.

IN THIS ISSUE

August 16, 1975

EDITORIALS

98

ARTICLES

102 Urban Development: The Roof Falls In — *Joseph P. Fried*

106 China & Western Europe: The Peking-Athens Connection — *Nicos E. Devletoglou*

108 Exercise in Gentility: The Rockefeller CIA Report — *Alan Wolfe*

112 Is Rape a Sex Crime? — *Daniel Ben-Horin*

115 The Trident Fiasco: Obstacles on the Way to Doomsday — *Robert C. Aldridge*

BOOKS & THE ARTS

117 Amnesty International Report on Torture — *David Glanz*

118 Angela Davis: An Autobiography; Sobell: On Doing Time; Aptheker: The Morning Breaks — *Peggy Dennis*

119 Berger: Pyramids of Sacrifice — *Martin Lebowitz*

120 Architecture — *Jane Holtz Kay*

120 Crow's Catastrophe (poem) — *Duane Niatum*

123 Theatre — *Harold Clurman*

124 Steel Sculpture (poem) — *Judith Johnson Sherwin*

125 Art — *Lawrence Alloway*

126 Films — *E. Bradford Burns*

Publisher
JAMES J. STORROW Jr.

Editor
CAREY McWILLIAMS

Associate Publisher
LINDA EDER STORROW

Executive Editor
ROBERT HATCH

Literary Editor
EMILE CAPOUYA

Western Representative
GIFFORD PHILLIPS

Copy Editor, MARION HESS; Poetry Editor, GRACE SCHULMAN; Theatre, HAROLD CLURMAN; Art, LAWRENCE ALLOWAY; Music, DAVID HAMILTON; Dance, NANCY GOLDNER; Architecture, JANE HOLTZ KAY; Science, CARL DREHER; Advertising Manager, MARY SIMON; Circulation Manager, ROSE M. GREEN.

Washington, ROBERT SHERRILL; U.N., ANNE TUCKERMAN; Latin America, PENNY LERNOUX; London, RAYMOND WILLIAMS; Paris, CLAUDE BOURDET; Bonn, C. AMERY; Jerusalem, HERBERT KROSNEY; Canberra, C. P. FITZGERALD.

The Nation is published weekly (except the issues of January 4, July 12, July 26, August 9, August 23) by the Nation Company and copyright 1975 in the U.S.A. by the Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10014. Tel: CH 2-8400. Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y.

Subscription Price: One year $15; two years, $27.50. Add $1 per year postage for Canada and Mexico; $2 other foreign.

Change of Address: It is essential that subscribers ordering a change of address give four weeks' notice and provide their old as well as their new address. Please give Zip Code numbers for both addresses.

Manuscripts. All work submitted will be read by the editors. The magazine cannot, however, be responsible for the return of unsolicited manuscripts unless they are accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.

THE NATION

Volume 221
No. 4

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The court's decision in favor of Mr. Hiss was prompt and unanimous, based upon the favorable recommendation of the Boston Bar Association and an expressed assessment of the applicant's "good moral character." The state of New York is apparently precluded by law from readmitting to the bar an "unrepentant convicted felon"; Alger Hiss's final vindication in that quarter will probably have to await release of the FBI files and overturning of his conviction for perjury. But it is heartening to report this first major step on the road back for a man who has suffered much, and long, and with dignity.

Big Sticks and Big Mouths

Overt threats of force are emerging as a characteristic diplomatic style of the Ford Administration. In late 1974, Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger threatened OPEC countries with coercive responses if oil prices were raised. The orchestrated ensemble of Administration voices created the impression, here and abroad, that a Persian Gulf invasion was under contemplation. More recently, Mr. Ford and Mr. Schlesinger have taken pains to convey U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons, to use them first and to use them against states which do not possess such weapons.

Presumably, Administration strategists have concluded that there are short-run gains to be had by playing bully in the global village. The Arabs, as people have been saying for years, only understand force. (Arabs, of course, say the same thing about the Israelis and us.) As for the North Koreans and their supporters, they might get the wrong idea about our defeat in Indochina, our domestic economic difficulties and the War Powers Act. Muscle flexing may also help domestic political ratings; polls indicate that the jingoes of Ford's erstwhile constituency appreciate it. And, hell, it *is* fun! According to all photographic evidence, Ford and Kissinger got quite a kick out of the *Mayagüez* incident, though so ill-designed and executed a raid, losing more men than it saved, should have elicited resignations rather than toasts.

Power is a critical component in international relations. Plainly, many adversaries devise their own programs and strategies by calculating our power and our willingness to use it. Accurate assessments deter "adventures." We have an urgent interest in making sure that our vital needs and capacities are taken seriously, but an equally urgent interest in having others understand our restraint and commitment to the minimization of violence. The international system provides many ways of communicating forceful intentions without grandstanding: diplomatic notes, quiet affirmations of interest, foreign bases, movements of fleets, etc. But too much of such communication can itself threaten order. Hence the system also tries to set restraints. The U.N. Charter prohibits "the threat" as well as the use of force, and international custom has outlawed warmongering. This may not mean much in Washington; last September, Ford stated *ex cathedra* his lack of interest in international law if he concludes that an act is in "the best interests of the countries involved." The point which must be got through to Ford, Kissinger and Schlesinger is our compelling national interest in a system of minimum world order and the dangers their blustering poses to it.

Michael Reisman

Rape

Because it involves invasion of the most private part of the body, rape can be the most terrifying of all physical assaults. Because the law, police, prosecutors and judges have frequently been insensitive to the especially profound needs of victims of sexual attack, rape, says the FBI, is "probably the most underreported crime in the country." Janice C. Simpson writes in *The Wall Street Journal* of 50,000 reported rapes last year. Criminologists, she says, estimate the total number of rapes as high as 500,000.

Until just recently rape law has functioned (and perhaps was designed) to make conviction difficult, placing an unjustly heavy burden of proof on the victim and allowing defense attorneys to use a victim's previous sexual experience to make unfair and damaging inferences. But, as Daniel Ben-Horin reports elsewhere in this issue, the law in some states is beginning to change. Rape counseling by women's groups, social service agencies and police is becoming more prevalent—though still scattered and too limited given the massive numbers involved. As Ben-Horin says, the fight against rape has just begun. He suggests rape might be most usefully analyzed as a form of assault rather than as a sexual deviance. Looking at rape as an assault, as the most terrifying form of mugging, helps remove much of its sexual mythology which, Ben-Horin's article indicates, is all too much still with us. This change in approach might be useful in countering sexist notions of women's role in rape. In cases of assault, past experience, degree of resistance and pernicious notions of women's mysterious sexuality become irrelevant. Similarly, treating homosexual rape as assault removes what to many is still a taboo component and allows reasoned discussion and deliberation on the issue. This change in attitude is a promising one. Bringing rape out of the sexual closet may be the first major step toward its elimination.

A Battling Prosecutor

James R. Thompson, the U.S. Attorney who put former Illinois Governor and U.S. Appellate Court Judge Otto Kerner in prison and made more than a few dents in Richard Daley's Chicago machine, is running for the Republican nomination for governor of Illinois. We wish him well. Wisely picked by Sen. Charles Percy for the prosecutor's job, Thompson in less than four years has indicted 350 government employees and has successfully prosecuted 97 per cent of those so far brought to trial—including several of Daley's favored political cronies as well as fifty Chicago police officers, some on brutality charges.

Thompson has wisely quit the U.S. Attorney's office in order to campaign, thus avoiding even the appearance of latent conflicts of interest bound to crop up when a prosecutor seeks political cash. The general election is more than a year away, and he has yet to make public specific program plans or policies. Apart from his vague self-identification as a Republican who expects campaign help from President Ford, and his evident commitment to tough prosecution of corrupt politicians, ideologically he is still pretty much an unknown. So is his prospective Democratic opponent, Gov. Daniel Walker, who chaired the commission which produced the *Rights in Conflict* report on the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

riots at the 1968 Chicago Democratic National Convention. Walker has spent much of his present term trying to build a solid base of support outside the Daley machine; like other new Governors, he has yet to win a reputation as a solid, active progressive who can cause significant changes in his home state.

Though *Newsweek* warns that civil libertarians faulted what they view as Thompson's too-eager use of grand jury subpoena power and forced immunity-granting testimony—criticisms which should be pursued—Thompson's record on the whole has been extraordinary. He will be missed as U.S. Attorney, but as Governor, this honest and courageous man just might be willing and able to attack corruption and injustice within the state's jurisdiction. Certainly he would be a tough antagonist in battles with the corrupt Chicago machine. If his political program matches the freshness and daring of his record as U.S. Attorney, Thompson will prove a strong candidate and, if elected, a remarkable Governor.

Copyright and Copy Rip-off

The Congress, when it reconvenes in September, will find on its legislative plate once again a copyright revision bill. Since such legislation was first introduced in 1965, the matter is by now exceedingly ripe. The present bills before the House (H.R. 2223) and the Senate (S.22) are virtually identical. It is to be hoped that finally some long-pending issues may be resolved.

At the heart of these issues are the effects of technological developments upon the dissemination of the work of authors of all types, from technical articles to poetry. The only comprehensive copyright law ever passed by Congress was enacted in 1909, which surely qualifies it as an antique. Since its passage it has been adapted, fitted and interpreted to protect the rights of authors and publishers to new uses of their works, such as radio, records, motion pictures and television—not one of which was mentioned in the original law. By and large, ways have been found to enable the old law to meet the challenges posed by these developments.

Now, however, has come a new and subtler technological device, photocopying, which cuts much closer to the bone. Electronic media and the like were entirely new forms of dissemination, and could be dealt with as analogues of the original ink on paper. They constituted no more than additional arms of publishing, increasing its range many-fold; photocopying metaphorically cuts publishing off at the knees. When the ancestor of the present legislation was introduced in 1965, the photocopy machine was a rare and expensive new toy; today, symbolized by the ubiquitous Xerox copier, it sits ready for instant use in nearly every library in the country.

Many uses to which the copier is put strike at the very heart of copyright itself. This concept, as Henry George put it, "rests upon the natural, moral right of each one to enjoy the products of his own exertion." Few would argue with that, but there are many—both of intelligence and of good will—who are unthinkingly engaged in eroding the rights of authors and publishers in the name of academic freedom. Edmon Low, president of the American Library Association, is quoted as saying: ". . . there's no truth to the claim that this process is leading to diminishing sales because people are resorting to photocopying instead of purchasing original works." Mr. Low could not be more wrong.

What needs to be understood is the distinction between *occasional* and *systematic* copying. The former is no threat to anyone and, given the existence of the necessary equipment, is essential to the free flow of information, from author to publisher to scholar. Systematic copying, on the other hand, is planned, purposeful, and results in a clear loss of royalties to authors, circulation to magazine publishers, and sales to publishers of books. It occurs whenever a library adopts the policy of using its photocopy equipment to provide prints of magazine articles, poems, chapters from books, and the like, to teachers for their classes, branch libraries or whole school and college systems on a regular basis. It is, in fact, a "rip-off" of serious dimensions against authors and publishers.

We do not say that there is malice in this practice; quite the contrary. Mr. Low and his colleagues in the library and academic world are quite sincere in protesting that they have no desire to do damage to authors—their natural allies—and that they are, after all, only providing a needed service to scholars and others on which they make no profit. All quite true, but away from the point. Profits *are* being made from this service, and they are made at the expense of the creators and producers of ideas. The funds which formerly went into the purchase of additional copies of books and additional subscriptions to journals and magazines, are not reverting to college treasuries or library budgets; they are in fact being expended—in full—to the manufacturers of copying equipment: in leasing fees, usage charges and purchase of paper and processing supplies.

This business has made enemies out of natural friends; it has turned authors against scholars (very often their own colleagues), and publishers against libraries (their own best customers). Magazines by the hundreds (principally the technical journals, though this magazine and others in its class are no exceptions) can attest to the loss of subscriptions, and of vitally needed income, which has resulted from the advent of the copy machine. As Barbara Ringer, U.S. Register of Copyrights, says: "I don't regard authors and publishers and teachers and librarians as natural enemies. It is extremely painful to see them at each other's throats." And meanwhile, the equipment manufacturers smilingly count their growing profits, unnoticed.

H.R. 2223 and S.22, which if passed will become the first copyright revision enacted by the Congress in sixty-six years, contain (in Sections 107 and 108) thoughtful definitions of the "fair use" of copyrighted material and of the rights of libraries. We hope that these provisions will survive intact, and that the legislation passes promptly. It is long overdue. But it would indeed be well for Congress to look critically and carefully into the large industry which exclusively has reaped the profits of the new arrangement. Technology can harness what technology has created. There are today quite practicable devices that can, with the use of magnetic tape storage and computer terminals, record accurately, by title and author, the number of copies of copyrighted material turned out on these machines—and compute, as well, the proper royalties thereon. Rarely have so few owed so much to so many.

James J. Storrow jr.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

URBAN DEVELOPMENT

THE ROOF FALLS IN

JOSEPH P. FRIED

Nelson Rockefeller left behind in New York two major contributions to urban construction: the Albany Mall, a billion-dollar, Brobdingnagian boondoggle of office and civic structures that has changed the downtown skyline of the state's capital city, and the New York State Urban Development Corporation, a $2 billion superagency that has been changing the face of many other cities from Brooklyn to Buffalo. At last word, the Albany Mall was still standing; the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) was not.

The stunning collapse of this once-powerful agency, the ramifications of which are being felt around the nation, is testimony to how far we have come from those days in the 1960s when the flames of urban riots crackled in squalid slums, when "urban crisis" was a catchword on the lips of worried officials, when many business and banking leaders, as well as anti-poverty activists, were spouting the rhetoric of urban salvation.

It was in this atmosphere that the UDC was born in 1968, when major financial institutions were willing to provide the financing without which it could not carry out its mission of rebuilding blighted areas and combatting economic stagnation throughout the state. Seven years later the urban crisis, in national perception if not in reality, has gone the way of the Great Society that sought to deal with it. And in this atmosphere of sharply reduced urgency, banks and investment houses have found that, rather than being the socially worthwhile, and financially profitable, risk it had been in the 1960s, the UDC has become a reckless enterprise to be cast off with dispatch.

Has it? Was the UDC presided over by an irresponsible, imprudent management that undertook too many projects that would have been too risky in the best of times, and were certainly so in a somersaulting economy? Had it become an unsupervised, bureaucratic monster, blindly bent on its mission of urban reclamation, while heedless of the limitations imposed by a financially hard-pressed society? Or was it the victim itself of these limitations, despite maximum caution consistent with its ambitious task? Was it the victim of unjustified abandonment by a financial community driven by unwarranted but self-fulfilling fears and misconceptions about the UDC's strength and future—the same fears and misconceptions that are now allegedly driving the same financial institutions to cast adrift the entire city of New York?

These questions—posed here in the extreme terms that have characterized much of the debate over the fall of the agency—may ultimately be answered by a special state commission that New York Gov. Hugh Carey recently established to determine the causes of the debacle and its implications for a number of other state agencies similarly financed by so-called "moral-obligation" bonds, the controversial method of raising capital that originated in New York and is now employed in twenty-five other states.

Once the most powerful urban renewal agency in the nation, the New York State Urban Development Corporation was established by a reluctant state legislature in the spring of 1968. It was just after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the disturbances that broke out in several cities in the wake of the slaying. This unrest, along with intense pressures from then Governor Rockefeller, convinced some of the balking legislators that the Governor might have had a point when he insisted that his proposed urban renewal superagency was the kind of "extreme measure" needed to launch a bold and aggressive assault on urban decay in the state.

Resistance to Rockefeller's "public benefit corporation" had come not only from suburban legislators who feared that the UDC would seek to crack through the zoning barriers that prevented housing for the poor and minorities from being built in many suburban communities. It came also from such liberal proponents of integration as then Mayor John Lindsay of New York. Whatever influence political and personal rivalry with Rockefeller might have had on his judgment, Lindsay contended that he opposed the UDC as a "distantly operated bulldozer" that would wield its power with little sensitivity to local needs.

Rockefeller, in turn, had more in mind than a vision of decrepit slums giving way to a bright new order. At the time, he had his eye on the 1968 Republican Presidential nomination, and for that a reputation as a man willing to take innovative steps to meet the pressing needs of the day would not have hurt. There are also those who are convinced that the Governor was not indifferent to the opportunities that his proposed agency and its revenue-raising bonds would present to the investment community, a prominent element of which was brother David's Chase Manhattan Bank.

In any case, the UDC was endowed with an unprecedented array of powers with which to carry out its task. It could undertake the development of residential, industrial, commercial and civic facilities—entire new towns if it chose—either building them directly or arranging for private developers to do so. It could condemn land, sell up to $1 billion worth of bonds to finance its activities (later increased to $2 billion), make extensive use of federal housing subsidies, and even build housing in towns and villages that did not want it—a bitterly controversial power later rescinded by the legislature when the agency sought to sponsor 900 subsidized apartments in several towns of suburban Westchester County.

Inasmuch as the most impressive powers on paper mean little without the talent to implement them, Rockefeller took great pains to find the best man to head the UDC. Instead of reaching into the state's patronage precincts for a loyal functionary, he brought down from New England, as the UDC's president and chief executive officer, Edward

Joseph Fried, who reports on housing for The New York Times, *is the author of* Housing Crisis U.S.A. (*Praeger and Penguin paperback*).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Logue, who had gained a widespread and controversial reputation as head of urban redevelopment programs in New Haven and Boston. In fact, as the public was to learn when Rockefeller was appointed Vice President last year, so eagerly did he want Logue that he made the New Englander a gift of $31,000 to enable him to pay off debts before leaving Boston, and a $145,000 loan so that he could buy a cooperative apartment on Manhattan's East End Avenue.

With urban experts across the country watching, Logue and the UDC plunged into their task—"fast-tracked it," as he and his assistants were fond of saying later whenever they contrasted their efforts with the "slow-track" endeavors of such traditional New York agencies as the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal and the Housing Finance Agency. By early this year, the UDC had completed or put into construction housing for 34,000 families, mostly low- and moderate-income people, in 117 developments located in fifty communities. That amounts to nearly 25 per cent of all the government-aided housing built in New York State in the past six years. The UDC had also sponsored or aided some $200 million worth of industrial, commercial and civic projects, including a 400,000-square-foot industrial park in East Rochester and a convention center in Niagara Falls. (The Albany Mall was not one of its projects.) And it had begun construction on three entirely new communities: Radisson near Syracuse, Audubon near Buffalo and, perhaps the jewel in the crown of UDC's aspirations, a 5,000-family, $400-million city-within-a-city on Roosevelt Island, formerly known as Welfare Island, the 2-mile-long, underdeveloped sliver in the East River opposite Manhattan's silk-stocking East Side.

But also by early this year, the roof was falling in on the UDC, and Logue was desperately fighting to salvage his reputation. In February, the agency defaulted on $100 million in short-term notes and a $30-million bank loan. It was without cash to pay the contractors working on eighty-five projects under construction, including unfinished housing for 20,000 families. Some of the building concerns were beginning to pull their people off the jobs and the possibility loomed that work would halt on major construction projects from Roosevelt Island to Lake Erie, throwing 6,000 men out of work at a time when the construction industry was already in a depression. Moreover, the credit of the state itself was at stake; if one of its most visible and powerful agencies was unable to meet its financial obligations, what standing could the entire state government have in the eyes of investors?

The immediate cash crisis of the UDC—which preoccupied Governor Carey and his month-old Democratic administration to the point where other important state business had to be put aside—stemmed from the fact that the major banks and investment houses, which had bought or underwritten the UDC's long-term bonds and short-term notes in the past, absolutely refused to do so any more. The agency, they insisted, was no longer a viable proposition. Too many of its projects, including Roosevelt Island, were now uncertain of success, the bankers held, creating the strong possibility that the agency would never generate the revenues necessary to pay off its obligations. Given this "reality," there was no way the financial houses could underwrite any more UDC securities issues (that is, buy them with the intention of reselling at a profit to investors), let alone buy the offerings for their own portfolios. Without the steady stream of funding that is the lifeblood of any real estate developer—and in large part that is what the UDC was—the agency could no longer function.

SUMMER SCHEDULE

During the summer, *The Nation* will *not* appear on the following date: August 23.

Under intense questioning from state legislators, who began a series of hearings into what many saw as a frightening development in the state's fortunes, the bankers sought to justify their actions. Frank Smeal, executive vice president of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, one of the first of the major institutions to withdraw from underwriting UDC securities, explained at one hearing: "We sought desperately from the management of UDC evidence that they could make it, but we couldn't get any."

For his part, Logue vigorously denied that the UDC was basically unhealthy. He maintained that it had been temporarily hurt by an inflation-stricken bond market and by the Nixon administration's long freeze on new federal housing subsidies, that its "assumed risk" was greater than its "actual risk," and that the agency was once more the target of "discredited" ill-wishers who wanted to see it fail. And, in his last public statement before resigning in February under pressure from Governor Carey, he burned his bridges to the financial community by asserting that the UDC was being done in by "short-sighted" and financially frightened men who, from "corporate board rooms," were seeking to "dictate public policy to public officials by fiat." (It was an accusation similar to one Mayor Abraham Beame would later make in his attempt to deal with New York City's severe financial problems.)

The confrontation between the UDC and the financial giants (Chase Manhattan, First National City, Bankers Trust, Chemical Bank and Merrill Lynch had also bought or profitably underwritten past UDC securities issues) thus reached the point of no return. The agency had always had a high-risk image in the eyes of investors—Moody's Investor Service had rated some of its bond issues as Baa-1, fifth down on a scale of soundness—and until Logue reorganized the UDC in 1973, bringing in a new financial director, many bond analysts and investment bankers were dissatisfied with its accounting methods and financial reports. Nonetheless, through the summer of 1974, the UDC had sold some $800 million of its long-term, tax-exempt bonds, as well as various short-term notes, though at somewhat higher interest rates.

But by last fall the agency could negotiate another $275-million bond sale only at a disturbingly high, tax-exempt-interest cost averaging 9 per cent—the equivalent of an 18 per cent taxable return for an investor in the 50 per cent bracket—and then the state had to agree to several major conditions set forth by the banks and bond houses involved.

One condition was that a special task force be established to study the UDC's situation and recommend legislative changes in its operations and financing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

methods. Another was that the agency lighten its borrowing load by selling off a large number of its project mortgages to the Housing Finance Agency. And a third was that the UDC not undertake any additional projects. This led then Gov. Malcolm Wilson (who had succeeded Rockefeller and was running against Carey in an unsuccessful bid for a full term of his own) to request firmly that the UDC's directors not undertake any new commitments "without my personal approval on a project-by-project basis." Previously, the directors had approved projects on their own authority.

Not surprisingly, all of this took place behind the scenes. No public announcement was made of the task force to study the UDC. The public prospectus for last fall's bond issue made it appear that the agency's officials, in their own wisdom, had decided to seek the Governor's approval for any new projects. (One court suit recently filed by a purchaser of $100,000 worth of bonds from that issue charged that the prospectus had concealed "adverse information.")

But the UDC's troubles would not long remain out of the public glare. Some critics of the agency felt it was time to bring public pressure to bear on what they considered Logue's reckless march to insolvency. One day last September, I spent several hours in the apartment of a prominent figure in New York's housing-development community, who had been involved in UDC projects and who now painted a grim picture of an agency desperately trying to stay afloat on shrinking resources, an agency that had allegedly overextended itself by plunging into far too many projects doomed to red ink, some of them already in serious difficulty. He cited construction defects and renting problems in housing developments in Buffalo and Niagara Falls, "excessive" preliminary expenditures for other projects that had proved "abortive," and such "major misjudgments" as the construction of a $6-million department store in Syracuse for a company that quickly went bankrupt.

Logue responded to a request for comment with a rebuttal that took five hours over two days. In his 46th-floor office in mid-Manhattan, with spectacular views of the entire city and its suburbs, including a number of UDC projects, he and his financial director, Robert Adelman, pulled out volumes of data involving present and projected revenues, anticipated borrowings, debt-service requirements and reserves for losses. Their message was that the agency was basically sound, was taking necessary defensive steps to cope with a tax-exempt bond market that had soured for public agencies generally, and that while the UDC had made a few mistakes that resulted in some renting and construction problems, these were inevitable in a fast-paced development program and minor blemishes when seen "in perspective."

"You don't do anything at the pace we do and don't make mistakes," Logue said. "But have we made excessive mistakes? No." At another point, replying to the contention that the UDC had taken "undue risks," such as the Roosevelt Island new town (critics insist its out-of-the-way location will make many of its apartments "unmarketable"), Logue pulled off his eyeglasses, gazed reflectively at the architectural citations that the UDC had received for a number of its projects, and said: "When I came down here, I was told the existing agencies and tools were not working. If we behaved in only the same way other agencies did, what was the point of creating us?"

Did the dizzying array of statistics and charts justify Logue's optimism or his critics' pessimism? Only an accountant, it seemed, could possibly cut through to the truth, but even the accountants were having problems. S.D. Leidesdorf, the agency's own accounting firm, noted in its then current report "various uncertainties giving rise to possible nonrecoverability of certain amounts of mortgage loans and advances receivable and project costs," and concluded, "We are presently unable to evaluate the effect of such uncertainties on the adequacy of the reserves for possible losses." In laymen's terms, Leidesdorf was unable to say whether the UDC was sound or not. The auditing firm also cited without comment the "uncertainties" over UDC's prospects for borrowing—in an inflationary bond market that offered more attractive investments elsewhere—the additional $900 million it needed to complete the construction it had started or was "committed" to start, as well as the "uncertainties" over the burden of the high interest rates the agency would have to pay where it did find buyers for its securities.

Whatever the uncertainties last fall, they were not long lasting. The newspaper report of Wilson's curb on new projects and of his establishing the state task force (it later concluded that the UDC's cash situation was "critical"), along with the news that financial leaders were deeply worried about the UDC's future, turned out to be the first of a series of articles that would come to a climax in February with news of the superagency's default and ruin.

To cure this default, and permit the UDC at least to complete its construction in progress, Governor Carey appointed Richard Ravitch, a major New York builder, as the agency's unpaid chairman to negotiate with the still balking bankers and with the legislative leaders in an attempt to raise the needed money. Three months of delicate bargaining followed, and resulted in a financial package made up of $410 million in loans and appropriations from the state, supplemented by a $140-million revolving loan fund from the major commercial banks.

But the problems are far from over. The UDC must still come up with nearly $300 million in long-term financing to repay the short-term state and commercial bank loans that are part of the package. And the entire scheme is intended only to permit the agency to complete projects actually in construction; the UDC is unlikely ever to begin another project, and still in doubt are a number of jobs that the agency was "committed" to but had not actually put into construction, including 3,000 (60 per cent) of the apartments that were to be an integral part of the Roosevelt Island new town.

To find meaning in the UDC wreckage, Carey also established a so-called Moreland Act commission headed by Orville Schell, a prominent lawyer. (The Moreland Act of 1907 gave the governor authority to appoint blue-ribbon bodies to investigate abuses in the state government and to propose reforms; its sanction has traditionally been reserved for the most scandalous controversies.) Apart from seeking to determine why the UDC met its fate, the Schell commission has a special mandate to look at the en-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tire question of "moral-obligation" financing.

Moral-obligation bonds are backed by the moral, rather than legal, commitment of the state to pay them off, in case of default by the agency selling them. The questions involving these securities go beyond their use by the UDC. Ten other New York State agencies, including the Housing Finance Agency and the Dormitory Authority, both major development bodies, issue moral-obligation bonds. So do housing and development agencies in some twenty-five other states. After what befell the UDC, investors have become exceedingly wary of moral-obligation securities and, as the feeling of risk has gone up, so have the difficulties of moral-obligation agencies to find buyers at acceptable interest rates.

Construction of more than $1 billion worth of nursing homes, hospital additions and other health-related facilities has been held up in New York State because of these fund-raising problems. In New Jersey and Michigan, housing-finance agencies report that the UDC's troubles either have made it difficult for them to sell all the securities they planned, or have forced them to pay much higher interest than they had anticipated. Officials of similar agencies in other states have expressed fear that the UDC situation would hurt their own financing.



The convenience of moral-obligation bonds is that, unlike the "full-faith-and-credit" securities backed by a state's legal commitment to pay them if necessary, they do not require approval of voters in referendums. Thus they have been a successful method of getting around the reluctance of the electorate to finance such often unpopular programs as low-rent housing. The moral-obligation concept originated in New York in 1960, one of its creators having been a little-known Wall Street bond lawyer named John N. Mitchell.

Moral-obligation financing has long had its critics, including New York State Controller Arthur Levitt, who considers it an unchecked and thus dangerous way to impose public debt—"backdoor financing," he calls it. Defenders of the concept hold that it is essentially sound, and that the fall of the UDC does not necessarily discredit the basic idea. For one thing, they note, not all moral-obligation bonds are the same. Those issued by the UDC, for example, were tied not to any specific projects and their revenues, but to the agency's assets in general, while those issued by the New York State Housing Finance Agency, as well as by the housing agencies in a number of other states, are so tied. This distinction may be crucial in assessing the UDC's problems, some experts say, and it will be one of the questions dealt with by the Schell commission.

In the end, however, the fundamental issue raised by the plight of the Urban Development Corporation is far greater than the nuances of financial-market securities. It goes to the heart of the fact—which this country still does not acknowledge—that only a long-range, public effort will make possible the construction and rehabilitation needed if 10 million or more American families are to live in decent housing and decent neighborhoods rather than in urban and rural slums. Reflecting on the UDC catastrophe, Richard Ravitch, the socially conscious builder brought in to rescue the agency from its immediate cash crisis, ventured that the UDC's troubles demonstrate that "we're paying in the 1970s for the ebullience of the 1960s—we're finding that our resources are more limited than we thought."

But a more appropriate explanation of the UDC's fall may have been provided unwittingly by Frank Smeal, the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company official, when he was asked whether banks had a commitment to the social goals of agencies like the UDC. "Social goals are funded one way in this country," Smeal declared, "and economic goals another way."

And that, it seems, is the essential point. Rebuilding the slums is a long-term and financially risky endeavor at best, one in which reverses will be suffered, mistakes made and money lost—just as mistakes are made and money is wasted in mindlessly building and rebuilding the kind of weapons structure deemed vital by the Pentagon and its boosters in Congress (who, invariably, are among the first to condemn "waste" in social programs). Whether Edward Logue and his people took undue risks and made too many mistakes will better be judged after the Schell commission has completed its investigation. But the point is that the private investment market, skittish and volatile, buffeted as much by psychological forces and currents as by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic conditions, can hardly be expected to have the staying power needed to underwrite a task as difficult, and as vulnerable to disheartening setbacks as wiping out the slums. Rather, the job must be done by American society generally, and that means sufficient public funds for subsidized housing and redevelopment programs to begin with, as well as a willingness by government to take the ultimate risk when it does seek to draw private capital into the effort.

Such a willingness implies that the federal government must guarantee private investments made in state and local programs to rebuild the worst slums. In the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Washington took what appeared to be a first step in that direction. The Act authorized federal loan guarantees for the obligations issued by state housing finance and development agencies, guarantees that would place the "full faith and credit of the United States" behind these securities should the agencies involved run into trouble. Clearly, such guarantees would make the obligations less risky, and the agencies less prone to abandonment by investors and underwriters who had second thoughts about the viability of the enterprise. As usual with federal housing programs, however, this one is too little (the total amount of guaranteed obligations may not exceed $500 million nationwide, an amount the UDC alone could use to complete its projects in construction) and it exists in rhetoric rather than reality (Congress still has not appropriated any money for the guarantee provision, and the Ford Administration is known to be opposed to implementing it).

In short, it's business as usual on the national housing scene—where, of course, the *public* subsidy programs remain as vastly underfunded and mired in red tape as ever. Meanwhile, the fall of the New York State Urban Development Corporation is a harsh and vivid reminder that American society is still a long way from meeting a moral obligation of its own: that of making possible "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family"—a goal proclaimed by the Congress more than a quarter-century ago. □

CHINA & WESTERN EUROPE

THE PEKING-ATHENS CONNECTION

NICOS E. DEVLETOGLOU

Athens

A few months ago, when a high-ranking Greek diplomat unintentionally parked his car illegally in downtown Peking, a crowd of "enthusiastic" Chinese gathered quickly and completely dismembered it in a matter of minutes. Of all the barriers to understanding between China and Europe, it is often said that humor, if not the oldest, is the least surmountable. What matters more in this case, however, is that the "lesson" to the unsuspecting lawbreaker was hushed up by both the Chinese and Greek Governments.

China is currently mounting a massive campaign throughout Australasia, Japan, Canada and the Third World to establish the notion that Western Europe could soon prove powerful enough to make a decisive contribution to world peace. To the unconcealed amazement of both Russia and America, the Chinese go further, suggesting that by the year 2000 China and Europe—two of the world's oldest civilizations—could develop between them a functional axis capable of containing Soviet and American world power.

Whether factual or fantastic, people in Europe are beginning to take this prospect seriously. Western European and Chinese leaders are today looking dispassionately at each other and at what suddenly appears to be a historic rapprochement between China and the European community, especially in the light of the massive recent British commitment to Europe.

The standard Chinese contention is that Europe has already become a prime focus of antagonism between the USSR and the United States; and that such rivalry for world leadership will, in the absence of a strong and united Europe, capable of taking an active part in international affairs, eventually provoke another world war. Accordingly, China feels that, with Europe, it too will ultimately become an inevitable target of "Russo-American imperialism." "Unite Europe to save war," were the dramatic words spoken by the Chinese Deputy Premier, Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping, in Paris a few weeks ago. And they led President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to speak almost as remarkably of the "identical conclusions" that French and Chinese leaders had reached on international questions following the interest and support China is showing for the European Economic Community. In return, Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping pledged that China would be appointing at once an ambassador to the Common Market because, as he put it, "the countries of Europe are making ceaseless progress toward union—both economic and political—in order to safeguard their independence, assure their security and contribute to the favorable evolution of the international situation."

But there is even more evidence to suggest that this extraordinary Chinese interest in European security stems from Peking's conviction that the increasingly publicized détente between Russia and America, especially as depicted in the obvious horse trading now taking place in Europe's southeastern regions, is a kind of freak collusion that is unlikely to last. As the Prime Minister of Belgium,

Nicos Devletoglou is professor of political economy at the University of Athens. He also teaches at the London School of Economics, and has been in the United States frequently as a visiting professor at various universities. Mr. Devletoglou is the author of Consumer Behavior (*Harper & Row*) *and co-author, with James M. Buchanan, of* Academia in Anarchy: An Economic Diagnosis (*Basic Books*).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in transit recently at Athens airport on his way back to Brussels from Peking, put it: "We were most impressed not only with the current Chinese interest in European security, but also with the mounting concern of China over a just settlement of the Cyprus crisis reflected in the consistently favorable references made to Greece as an integral part of Western Europe."

The Chinese think it virtually impossible that the precarious Russo-American entente in Europe—largely based on what they consider to be Henry Kissinger's "hegemonistic" vision of Russian and American supremacy in, respectively, the Balkans and the Middle East—can survive the strain of that other Palestine already being born in Cyprus. The argument is a compelling one, especially if one agrees with Peking that the expulsion of more than 200,000 people from their ancient, most fertile and prosperous homeland by the Turkish invaders of Cyprus is hardly the kind of international relations on which long-term tranquillity is built. Resentment is already building up fast, even among Turkish Cypriots who—notwithstanding the results of the June 8th "referendum" establishing a new Turkish "state" on the island—are becoming increasingly aware that their standard of life under Turkish military rule is not what they expected and that a prosperous future can be based only on a realistic cooperation with the Greek Cypriots. The basic Chinese fear that European sovereignty and independence are undermined by the Russo-American political duopoly in action on the Continent's southeastern flank thus appears legitimate enough.

Greece, in other words, is somewhat unexpectedly becoming an important link in what the Chinese foresee as a special Sino-European relationship. So much so in fact that, regardless of recent "progress" made in suppressing Greek interests in Cyprus, it now appears unlikely that the fate of that overwhelmingly Greek island in Southeastern Europe will be settled *in camera* by the colluding Russians and Americans. For the Chinese already know that if there is one outstanding pressure point—after the fall of Vietnam—on the American defense periphery, it is the government of President Park in Seoul. In direct response, therefore, to American gains in the Middle East, China is gradually activating the real threat that North Korea could soon be "liberating" South Korea in the standard Vietnamese pattern. This is why both Russians and Americans are bound, metaphorically at least, to be thinking in Korean as they are about to settle the fate of Cyprus. It is in precisely this context, too, that the New China News Agency (August 4, 1974) described last year's coup against Archbishop Makarios as the outcome of "prolonged, intensified contention between the two superpowers in the Mediterranean and their policies of aggression and hegemonism there and elsewhere." And a little later, again in support of besieged Hellenism in the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union was singled out for particular condemnation when Peking Radio on August 18, 1974, accused the Soviet leadership of having "tried its utmost to fan the flames and fish in troubled waters for its own benefit."

It has been said, of course, that China's new horizons in Europe via the Mediterranean, considering its own views on social justice, bring it awkwardly close to defending a capitalist Europe whose ways should normally be anathema to the People's Republic. As Georges Marchais, the French Communist Party leader, said recently at a meeting of the foreign press in Paris, "It is not only Teng. This is not the first time the Chinese Communist Party has defended a Europe of trusts and monopolies." Only at first glance, however, does this kind of criticism seem to make any sense. Getting seriously stuck at that level of analysis in contemporary international affairs betrays a mentality little removed from a permanent addiction to parking *à la grecque* in downtown Peking or gaily dismantling *à la chinoise* other persons' property on your front doorstep. As most European leaders now begin to see it, the Chinese are far more interested in world peace than they are in the domestic politics of other nations. Most political observers in Europe agree that China looks today mainly to the Right in Western Europe to preserve peace in the world. And indeed Peking's recent praise of both Edward Heath, when he was Conservative British Prime Minister, and Christopher Soames, British Ambassador to the Common Market, would so indicate. To the extent, too, that China



Vadillo, Siempre (Mexico)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

places its hopes on all those who stand for a strong and united Europe, whatever their views on social justice within their own countries, the impressive mandate which the British people have just given for a united Europe may well open the way to a significant development of Sino-European relations, at the expense of Europe's "special" relationship with the United States.

That is perhaps why a drastic reorientation of American foreign policy in Cyprus could well be the key to maintaining, and possibly strengthening, America's influence in Europe. For as things now stand, only by tradition is American foreign policy pro-European. Under the influence of the United States, the Greco-Turkish axis of NATO has collapsed, the prosperity and political stability of Cyprus have been left in ruins, and more bloodshed and turmoil are now likely in that area and elsewhere. Whether intentionally or not, the United States is becoming a serious embarrassment to European security.

It is against this background that the belief is now growing in Europe that American diplomacy is increasingly characterized by a certain contempt for all that is traditional and expendable—especially when it comes to handing out timely presents, in the all too familiar pattern whereby Eastern Europe and Vietnam were lost. Fewer and fewer people in Europe now hope, though many still do, that they are more of a sacred cow than those who preceded them to the slaughterhouse. Indeed, most Europeans are painfully aware that, for the first time since World War II, a majority of Americans are known to believe that the United States should not come to the defense of its allies in Western Europe in the event of an attack by Soviet military forces. With this kind of evidence before the average European, it would seem that not a million *Mayagüez* publicity stunts could stem the tide of opinion that has been systematically rendering less and less meaningful Western Europe's "special" relationship with the United States.

In this context, too, the whole Mediterranean area, along with Europe and the Middle East, is seen by China as a prime focus of contention between the two superpowers, thereby opening up a wide field of opportunity for China to oppose and discredit them. The Chinese particularly recognize the strategic importance to the major powers of facilities in the Mediterranean Sea, and this explains the special attention being poured upon Cyprus, Greece and Malta. Even a country such as Algeria has become a target for Chinese overtures, naturally based on Third World solidarity, though Algeria also falls well within China's long-term support of initiatives by Mediterranean nations aimed at expelling the Soviet and United States fleets from that sea. Soviet and American activity in the area is thus invariably seen in the framework of the future of the European Continent as a whole.

A commentary by the official New China News Agency (March 18, 1975) accordingly linked the Soviet Union's activities in the Mediterranean with its fight to seize bases, in the guise of "fishing" or "refueling" ports, from "another country" on the Atlantic Coast—presumably Portugal. The standard Chinese call to the Mediterranean people, with Greece as the centerpiece (mainly because of its French-inspired opaque relationship to NATO), to "unite and persevere" in order to preserve that region as "a sea of peace and tranquillity," is consequently in perfect harmony with Peking's anxiety over the fate awaiting all of Europe if it were to remain much longer united in theory but divided in practice. Hence, China's hope that Greece will soon become a full member of the European Economic Community. Hence, too, the Greek Prime Minister's recent statement that "it is mainly on political considerations that Greece looks forward to early full membership in the Common Market."

Undoubtedly, America's ties today with Western Europe in general and the European Economic Community in particular are still strong. The question is whether they are likely to remain strong. As Mr. Chou Po-ping, the Chinese Ambassador to Greece, said not long ago in Athens, "it will be a happy day when Europe realizes that the 'yellow peril' that she once saw in China has already become the 'yellow sun' that will comfort her for decades to come." Perhaps this epigrammatic, obviously propagandistic remark helps explain why Western European countries are less and less likely to object to China's surprisingly large mission in Cyprus and its increasingly sensitive treatment of Greece. □

EXERCISE IN GENTILITY

THE ROCKEFELLER CIA REPORT

ALAN WOLFE

On January 4, President Ford, reacting to newspaper articles which alleged that the Central Intelligence Agency had violated its charter, appointed a commission to investigate the charges and to examine the whole question of secret intelligence in a democratic society. There was no attempt to make the commission a cross section of the American people. Because of the centrality of the CIA to America's Establishment, only Establishment types were invited to participate. Two former Republican Governors, an ex-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, three former high Democratic officials, a conservative labor leader and an ex-college president with Navy ties were the ones asked "to determine whether the CIA has exceeded its statutory authority."

Six months and two days later, the commission pre-

Alan Wolfe teaches sociology and political science at Richmond College of the City University of New York. He is the author of The Seamy Side of Democracy: Repression in America (*David McKay Co.*).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sented to the President its report, which was (not without some debate) made public shortly thereafter. The first reaction, especially among broadcast journalists who read it fast in order to have an "instant analysis" for that evening's news, was one of surprise. Although the commission had obviously been appointed to head off Congressional investigations, although its membership was conservative and although its chairman, Nelson Rockefeller, was known to have great sympathy for the CIA, the commission used strong language to deplore what it called plainly illegal violations practiced by the agency under three different administrations. Rather than being a "whitewash" as almost everyone had expected, the "Report to the President" appeared, like the Kerner Report of what now seems ages ago, to be hard-hitting and aimed toward substantial reform. The CIA, once considered sacrosanct, could now be criticized, even by ambitious Republican politicians.

How explain the fact that a group of men who have benefited from and supported the existence of a clandestine cell within a democratic state would suddenly turn and engage in public criticism of practices they had once refused to acknowledge, let alone denounce? When that question is raised, it begins to become clear that the Rockefeller Commission's report is a far less critical document than it appeared initially to be, and that in its assumptions, analyses and recommendations it may tend to strengthen the worst features which the CIA has inflicted on American life.

These commissioners were *forced* to be critical of the CIA. The fact is that the standards of whitewashery have recently changed in the United States. Ten years ago, a government commission could excuse egregious behavior on the part of men in positions of trust by simply denying that it ever happened. That can no longer be done. A series of improprieties on the part of American politicians, from Kennedy to Ford, have made public officials in the United States seem about as truthful and law-abiding as an 18th-century highwayman. The effect of their transgressions of elementary rules of decency and fair play is predictable. A survey conducted by the University of Michigan shows drastic changes in popular faith in government. To the question, "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?," 22 per cent said some of the time in 1964 compared to 31 per cent in 1966, 37 per cent in 1968, and 44 per cent in 1970. The percentage who felt that government is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves increased from 29 per cent in 1964 to 34 per cent in 1966, 39 per cent in 1968, and 49.6 per cent in 1970. If one asks how long a government can exist with about half its citizens totally cynical, more recent figures collected by Cambridge Survey Research are even more dramatic: 38 per cent of those polled in 1972 thought America's leaders had consistently lied to them, compared to 55 per cent in 1974, and an astounding 68 per cent in the spring of 1975. Given this wholesale alienation from government—all of it based on perfectly reasonable conclusions from the evidence available—being critical and engaging in a whitewash can no longer be considered opposites; indeed, a government commission can perform the latter only by doing the former. In order to establish any believability whatsoever, Rockefeller and his colleagues had to find some hanky-panky and denounce it in suitably stentorian tones.

Thus the important point is not that this commission criticized the CIA, for that was decided, in a sense, well in advance. Two other interrelated issues are far more crucial: what was the CIA to be criticized *for* and what assumptions about the nature of the American political system form the basis of the proposed reforms? On these questions, the commission revealed a tired cold-war mentality, one which apparently needs to be asserted with ever greater vehemence as its reasons for existence wither away.

Any potential critic of the CIA certainly has a great deal of material from which to choose. Options range from a sincere and well-thought-out discussion of how one can have a supersecret government within a democratic society to the narrowest possible technical kinds of criticism. On this continuum, the Rockefeller Commission comes out near the latter pole. Its entire analysis can be reduced to three propositions:

—The CIA has had some trouble because of bad men. Solution: find good men.

—The CIA's troubles are also caused by improper and vague procedures. Solution: find new procedures.

—The CIA has broken the law. Solution: remind it that the law must be obeyed.

The CIA, we are told, committed some of its sins because of the character of the men associated with it. In theory a whole series of "internal controls"—audits, budget procedures, a chain of command and requirements for coordination—were imposed to insure that no hanky-panky took place. But hanky-panky did take place, a good deal of it, in fact. Furthermore, as the commission notes, much of the lawbreaking and charter violations engaged in by the CIA were quite well known to officials high in the agency. The fact that the system of internal controls did not prevent illegal acts is taken by the commission, in true Orwellian fashion, to indicate that the system of internal control *works*, for it shows that "the agency's system of internal communication can operate." Since the problem, therefore, does not lie in the structure of the CIA as such, it can only lie in the men who comprise the structure. Hence, the recommendations made are designed to insure that good men, not bad, are put in charge: "Persons appointed to the position of Director of Intelligence should be individuals of stature, independence and integrity," the commission writes, as if such gratuitous advice would have any meaning at all among professional spies. There then follows a series of recommendations, including the creation of new deputy directors, upgrading the inspector general, and bringing in nonagency lawyers—each one, in total contradiction to what the report just said, indicating that perhaps the system of internal controls does not work so well after all.

Secondly, the CIA is criticized because of problematic procedures. The Rockefeller Commission was astounded to learn that in two ambiguous areas, questions of jurisdiction between the FBI and the CIA had never been worked out. Although by law the CIA was prohibited from en-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gaging in domestic work and the FBI was supposed to keep its hands off foreign work, what does one do about either the activities of foreign missions, trade delegations and cultural branches within the United States, or about the international connections of U.S. political organizations? This boundary dispute was complicated by an additional factor; the FBI was allowed only to collect data, not to turn them into finished intelligence. The whole thing was a bureaucratic mess and, in its infinite charity, the commission chooses to blame the procedures, and not the CIA itself, for the transgressions which transpired. The result is to absolve the agency of blame, as can be seen in the way the commission handled the problem of CIA infiltration of domestic groups.

The government was interested in whether the outburst of domestic dissent in the late 1960s, such as the peace and black-power movements, had any international support, especially from enemies of the United States. While the answer was obvious to anyone who knew anything at all about those movements, both Democratic and Republican administrations were not so sure. Asst. Atty. Gen. (for civil rights, no less) John Doar, soon to make a name for himself in the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment hearings, proposed using all kinds of federal programs, including legal services and OEO, as means to collect secret information about domestic dissent. Doar's boss, Ramsey Clark, shared his concern, saying that it was "imperative" that the government receive "the most comprehensive intelligence possible regarding organized or other purposeful stimulation of domestic dissension, civil disorders and riots." That is hypocritical at best. There was purposeful stimulation of violence during this period, and it was highly organized by government as well, but it was the activity of police agents from the FBI and the CIA, not any foreign intervention. Clark, who probably understands all this now, if he had really wanted the information he sought, could have obtained it most effectively by calling in all the *agents provocateurs* in the United States (if a stadium large enough to hold them could have been procured) and asking them about their activities. To their credit, though, it must be pointed out that the Democrats never formally asked the CIA to take charge of investigating domestic dissent.

All this changed when Nixon came to power. The "Civil Disturbance Group" in the Justice Department, the Huston Plan and Operation Chaos were all designed to spy on domestic political movements, and the latter two did involve the CIA. Every study actually undertaken to see if there was foreign influence on domestic dissent concluded that there was not, but that did not check political surveillance of U.S. groups; it seemed, indeed, to make it more intense. As a result, not only did the CIA violate its charter, but it did so in spite of clear evidence that no special emergency existed to justify such an exception. Here is clearly an area where strong criticism of the agency would be in order.

Considering the offense, the Rockefeller analysis is an exercise in gentility. First, much of the blame is assigned to the jurisdictional mix-up. Clear lines between domestic and foreign activity should be established, the commissioners urge, and even when the CIA must operate in



Vadillo, Siempre (Mexico)

conjunction with the FBI, "the CIA should restrict its participation in any joint intelligence committees to foreign intelligence matters." What the commission objects to is not domestic spying per se but CIA involvement in it, for if the CIA is to be accepted by the American people it had better adhere to its charter. In the guise of reform, then, what the commission actually suggests is a change that would give the *FBI* greater strength by possessing what it now lacks, the ability to convert raw data into refined intelligence: "A capacity should be developed within the FBI, or elsewhere in the Department of Justice, to evaluate and coordinate intelligence and counterintelligence collected by the FBI concerning espionage, terrorism and other related matters of internal security." This sneaky inclusion of a recommendation concerning an agency with which the commission was not supposed to be dealing, when seen in the context of similar proposals contained in S.1, the proposed new criminal code, is a clear step in the direction of a police state advanced in the name of controlling a police state.

What begins as a soft criticism of the CIA thus turns into a grant of authority for the FBI. But even more amazing, considering active CIA participation in domestic spying, is the commission's attempt to blame not only faulty procedures but also the baddest of the bad men, former President Nixon. Now out of power, he seems a safe enough target when the blame is not to be put on the blameworthy. "The Presidential demands upon the CIA appear to have caused the agency to forgo, to some extent, the caution with which it might otherwise have approached the subject." In this version, the CIA was a reluctant participant, drawn into actions which it would have preferred to avoid, by the seductive pleas of the persuasive Nixon. "Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA to perform what are essentially internal security tasks," the commission asserts as a formal recommendation. This picture of the agency as a spotless maiden violated by a lustful President makes a striking tableau but has little to do with the realities of power at the highest levels of American government. True, the most sophisticated heads of the agency preferred to take on as little domestic business as possible, because of the risk of being found out, but they were hardly reluctant to enter the area when it served their interests to do so.

Having dealt with bad men and bad procedures, the commission turns to the question of how the CIA's short-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

comings could be improved through better laws. An example of their approach to law arises on the question of mail covers. Existing law quite specifically forbids any agency of the U.S. Government to open the mail of any U.S. citizen. Nonetheless the CIA decided that it wanted to open mail anyway, and it created a special task force for the purpose. With American ingenuity, the techniques became increasingly sophisticated, as, in typical bureaucratic behavior, the operation expanded. Although the illegality of the acts was clear to all involved, the nation's chief lawyer, John Mitchell, and its head mailman, Winston Blount, both approved the program, the latter quite enthusiastically. Eventually the operation was terminated, on purely practical grounds. Having discovered all this violation of the law, what is the commission to do? Its recommendations:

> The President should instruct the Director of Central Intelligence that the CIA is not to engage again in domestic *mail openings* except with express statutory authority in time of war.
>
> The President should instruct the Director of Central Intelligence that *mail cover* examinations are to be in compliance with postal regulations; they are to be undertaken only in furtherance of the CIA's legitimate activities and then only on a limited and selected basis clearly involving matters of national security. (Emphasis in the original report.)

If a prison warden were to tell a murderer that murder was against the law, that he should practice it no more, and then set the man free to try to obey the law, Nelson Rockefeller, with his simplistic law-and-order mentality, would be incredulous. But when the lawbreakers are men of the CIA the situation seems different.

In pursuing the question of whether the CIA engaged in unlawful activity, the commission's devotion to its mandate is impressive. President Ford had requested an examination of the CIA's *statutory* authority, and that is exactly what was given. Yet there is something disengenuous about this concern with strictly legal matters. In the area of clandestine operations, laws can be of only the most minimal importance. Laws cannot specify what an undercover agent should do when a rebellion he has fomented turns to violence. Laws cannot determine in an everyday sense whether a given activity is foreign or domestic or some combination of both. Laws cannot inform a director about whether a request for intelligence data is proper or not. The CIA, by its very nature, is an extralegal, often illegal body; to ask that it conform to the law is a strange way of improving its function, one which constitutes a subtle hint that it continue to break the law, but in a less obvious fashion. In no other area does the caution of the commission come out more strongly than in this attempt to stop habitual criminals from their crimes by reading the law book to their faces.

The effect of the decision to concentrate on men, procedure and laws is to ignore or skip lightly over, quite deliberately it would seem, a series of structural and philosophical issues which might have raised more serious questions about the nature of the CIA. Why, for example, is it necessary to have a clandestine apparatus at all? This is no longer an idealistic question posed by some misguided world federalist but a sober question being asked by a number of far from radical members of Congress. The commission, which acknowledges the change, also passes over it perfunctorily. The Communists, it seems, are still out to do in the United States. Traditional cold-war polarities are brought out of the closet: "In an open society such as ours, the intelligence opportunities for our adversaries are immeasurably greater than they are for us in their closed societies," to which the proposed remedy is the usual one of making us more like them. Détente has made only one change in the commission's anti-communism when compared to the hysteria of John Foster Dulles: the latter capitalized the "c" in Communist and the commission does not. Otherwise the usual banalities about "national security" are trotted out one more time.

A second question which the commission might have asked is: whose interests does the CIA serve? With all the publicity that has emerged about the cozy relationship between the CIA and U.S. multinational corporations, this is suddenly a real concern. But then the hypothesis that "the American people" could receive more from turning the entire CIA budget over to the construction of new hospitals is beyond the realm of possibility for these men.

Finally, there is the tricky issue of how, if we are going to have a CIA, it can be reconciled with the existence of a democratic political system. In dealing with this issue, which can no longer be ignored, the commission makes clear its assumptions about the nature of American society. Noting that there might be in theory a conflict between an open, democratic government respectful of civil liberty and the existence of a covert apparatus of espionage and surveillance, the commission reassures us that such a conflict need not exist in practice. In fact, it suggests a covert apparatus actually *promotes* civil liberty: "Individual liberties . . . depend on maintaining public order at home and in protecting the country against infiltration from abroad and armed attack. Insuring domestic tranquillity and providing for the common defense are not only constitutional goals but necessary conditions for a free, democratic system. The process of orderly and lawful change is the essence of democracy. Violent change, or forcing a change of government by the stealthy action of 'enemies, foreign or domestic' is contrary to our constitutional system." Thus when the CIA "monitors" meetings and infiltrates political groups, it is contributing to civil liberty, not detracting from it. The spirit of Hugo Black rests comfortable in the bosom of Richard Helms.

Except for undertaking some convenient rationalizations like the above argument that covert activities benefit the cause of liberty, the Rockefeller Commission decided to concentrate on narrow questions of personnel and procedure rather than on substantive questions about democracy and the requirements of secrecy. And that is not surprising. A truly critical commission might have investigated whether the CIA operated in conformance with the principles and standards of a democratic and open society, except that if such a society had existed, there would have been no CIA to investigate. In other words, the mere fact that there is a CIA guaranteed that the purpose of this commission could never be a neutral and thorough airing of important issues. Its purpose from the beginning was something else entirely—to manage the "crisis" brought on for the first time in the agency's history by extensive public disclosure of CIA activity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As I pointed out previously in this magazine ("Behind the Dual State: Emergence of the CIA," March 29), an agency like the CIA has two simultaneous and contradictory functions. On the one hand, in order to be of service to a ruling class trying to maintain a crumbling empire throughout the world, it must, to be effective, be allowed its clandestine nature. But on the other hand, in order to conform to democratic standards and be legitimate in the eyes of the people, the CIA must be seen as "accountable" to the public in one way or another. A precarious balance established over a twenty-five-year period has recently been breaking down. Public disclosures have made American citizens increasingly intolerant of this behemoth in their midst. What is to be done about it? The Rockefeller Commission has tried its hardest to reassert an equilibrium between the need for efficiency and the need for legitimacy, but it is extremely doubtful that it has succeeded.

"An effective and efficient intelligence system is necessary; and to be effective, many of its activities must be conducted in secrecy." Having admitted this, the Rockefeller Commission seems to push toward the side of efficiency. If activities have to be secret, how can there be any way to make them legitimate? The answer of the commission is to propose a series of reforms which would give the appearance of democracy without the fact. That is the only conclusion to be drawn when a group of men who are supposed to be serious suggest that bad men can be replaced by calling for good men, or that men who rose in their profession by breaking laws can be sworn to uphold them. By putting the problem that way, the commission works under a logic which is the exact opposite of the logic of most of the American people. It was generally thought that the CIA had done some bad things, and needed to be reformed. But the Rockefeller Commission is suggesting by the assumptions that underlie its criticism that it is the American public which has done the bad things, and that that is what must be reformed. The "crime" of the American people is that they know too much. All of the reforms of the commission seemed designed to make sure that this knowledge is taken away from them. For example, in discussing the charges made against the CIA, the commission notes: "It became clear from the public reaction to these charges that the secrecy in which the agency necessarily operates, combined with the allegations of wrongdoing, had contributed to *widespread public misunderstanding of the agency's actual practices.*" It is we who are at fault. The recommendations of the commission are designed with one end in view, to see that we do not misunderstand again. The proposed reforms would clarify the nature of the CIA's authority, and "greater public awareness of the limits of the CIA's domestic authority would do much to reassure the American people."

There are only two ways out of the cul-de-sac of the dual state. One can move toward complete efficiency, in which case a democratic structure will be dropped completely—a solution which more and more seems to be catching on in some ruling-class circles. Or one can move toward complete democracy by trying to create a system that works for all and not for a tiny few. The Rockefeller Commission, by trying to do both, can do neither. One only hopes that the people struggling for democracy realize their vision before those who would totally abolish it realize theirs. □

IS RAPE A SEX CRIME?

DANIEL BEN-HORIN

Revision of the rape laws is definitely "on the agenda." For years, feminists tried in vain to convince lawmakers that sexual assault was a real contingency in the lives of women, and that a harrowing recital of a woman's entire sexual history was not germane to the prosecution of a sexual assailant. More often than not, these feminist lobbyists found themselves put on the defensive, attempting to refute such canards as, "Every woman secretly wants to be raped," or, "You can't thread a moving needle." Then, beginning last year, Michigan and California, followed by a slew of other states, passed laws which sharply reduced the evidentiary burden placed upon the rape victim. Although the specifics varied somewhat from state to state, the essence of these new laws was constant: no longer must a rape victim prove that she (or he) has been a model of chastity, since the admissibility of a victim's past sexual conduct has been severely limited; no longer must a victim produce a corroborating witness; no longer must a victim prove that the assault was physically resisted, now that the power of intimidation to negate resistance has been recognized.

According to *The New York Times*, rape has succeeded abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) as the number-one issue for women's rights advocates. The wholesale revamping of rape laws has been widely hailed as a feminist victory. But what kind of victory is it? Are public officials finally accepting the notion that a human being has an inalienable right to physical integrity, regardless of manner of dress, past sexual history or even gender?

The experience of one conservative state, Arizona, provides a cautionary context in which to answer these questions. The caution does not stem from the fact that a proposed bill revising the state's rape law failed in the just-concluded session of the state legislature; indeed, that the bill came very close to passage is extraordinary, considering Arizona's traditional aversion to any legislation that smacks of feminism, or progressivism generally.

It is the mood in which the issue was considered which makes one suspect that the trend toward rape-law revision may be deriving a significant portion of its motivation from

Daniel Ben-Horin is a free-lance writer and former editor of the Arizona New Times.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the same sexual stereotyping that feminists have long decried. For most of the Arizona advocates of rape-law revision, the issue was sex, and in the same old terms: women "own" it; men crave it; and it has become desirable (although not, as the vote showed, essential) to change the laws so that men who insist on taking sex by force can be more effectively prosecuted.

As Jean Malusinka sees it, those who wish to change rape laws in order to curb men's sex aggression are making the right move for the wrong reasons. Malusinka is a Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney and, as she was quoted recently in *Juris Doctor*, she is one of the increasing number of experts who do not see rape as inherent in male or female sexuality. Speaking of a sweeping revision of the California statutes concerning rape, she said, "It will make things easier for the victim, but nothing will really change the number of rape convictions or the number of reports until we convince the public that *rape is a crime of violence, not of sex.*" (Emphasis added.)

The Arizona legislature is very likely to amend the state's rape laws next session. It is highly unlikely, however, that many of the legislators will amend their own firm conviction that rape is a crime having its roots in male voraciousness for that treasured possession of females: sex. A look at the tortuous path taken by the rape bill which just now was defeated gives an inkling of what will be involved in the long-range struggle to change American attitudes about this crime.

Arizona's bill, as originally introduced, replaced the word "rape" in the statutes with "sexual assault," thereby opening up the possibility of prosecuting homosexual rapists. It sharply limited the admissibility of evidence relating to the prior sexual conduct of the victim, and it removed from the victim the onus of proving that active resistance to the assault took place. The bill also classified as sexual assault in the first degree any act of sexual intercourse which was forced upon a victim who had reason to believe that the aggressor was armed.

The reclassification of rape as sexual assault strikes at the whole aura of the crime as being based on the complementary sexual urges of men and women, and that change in particular would appear to have been based on some broader interpretation of gender roles. But appearances can be deceiving; the bill was sponsored by two conservative Republicans, neither previously identified with the women's movement, and the bill's essential purpose was to beef up the law-and-order arsenal of police and prosecutors. An incident that was not directly related to the bill provides an insight into the atmosphere in which the bill was introduced and considered. "We're sick and tired of our women being raped," declared Raymond Shaffer at a press conference on March 6. Shaffer, who is president of the Greyhound Corp., was speaking in his capacity as chairman of the Special Task Force on Crime of a group, the Phoenix 40, which has appointed itself to prod the citizenry at large into civic involvement. The Phoenix 40 is composed of the conservative business leaders who have set the tone for this community and state for years. When the Phoenix 40 speaks of "our women," it is correct, at least grammatically, for all of its members are men.

Back at the legislature, there was naturally a fine line between those who supported the bill because they wanted to protect "their" women and those who backed its feminist and humanist aspects. In the state Senate, there is a relatively potent minority of legislators who would describe themselves as supporters of the women's movement. This group allied itself with the law-and-order crowd and passed the bill along virtually intact to the House of Representatives.

In the House, the smooth sailing ended. The problem was not concerted objection to any single aspect of the bill, but a general disinclination to view it as very important. Unlike the Senate, the House is controlled by Republicans and the bill was assigned to two committees whose combined membership of thirty contained at most three Representatives with even a glimmer of sympathy for the women's movement. A joint meeting of subcommittees from the two committees established the frame of reference in which the bill was considered.

The meeting was chaired by Rep. Diane McCarthy, one of the bill's prime sponsors and a noted opponent of the ERA. She got the session off on a light note with some jokes about a pay-toilet lock that had been placed on the door of the Speaker of the House. The mood of the meeting went from levity to hilarity when the question arose as to why Arizona statutes could not bring themselves to mention the word "sodomy," referring instead to "the infamous crime against nature." Republican Rep. Donna Carlson, another in the array of anti-feminist Arizona women legislators, quipped that the current wording allows the reader to conjure up "Whatever wild thing your imagination wants it to be," adding "that's why I like it."

Discussion of the bill continued on the same plane. "All females are devious," volunteered one male Representative. "Right, I'd agree to that," riposted Mrs. McCarthy.

Republican Rep. Sam McConnell put the issue in perspective, saying, "I hope you realize that the difference between rape and seduction is merely salesmanship." Shortly thereafter a volume on the nature of sexual criminals was passed around, evoking memories of flesh magazines in high-school locker rooms. "Quit looking over my shoulder," chuckled Democratic Rep. Steve Vukcevich to McConnell. Unanimous laughter accompanied virtually every sally about rape, that wellspring of guffaws.

The irony is that almost all the side slappers were supporting all or part of the bill and so, guffaws and all, the section of the bill dealing with the admissibility of a victim's past sexual conduct seemed certain to be passed, right up to the last day of the session. But in the hectic closing moments the admissibility section too fell by the wayside when the totally unrelated bill on which it had been unwisely "piggybacked" was defeated. The comments of several legislators give some clues as to why the bill was eviscerated and finally defeated, despite a widespread feeling that something should be done to facilitate rape prosecutions.

Representative McCarthy, a conservative herself, said that "We've got quite a few people who belong to the ultra-right wing and feel objection to including people of both sexes. They're offended by the mere thought that a man could commit [sexual] assault on another man." She seemed to be referring to the even more conservative Rep-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resentative Carlson, whose main contribution to the legislative session was to lead the fight to ban homosexual marriage officially, and who was noticeably cool toward the rape bill. When questioned, however, Mrs. Carlson said her doubts about the bill arose from the fact that "Most of the lawyers say it's going to be a prosecutor's nightmare." Prosecutors are already overburdened, explained Representative Carlson and another Republican legislator who took the same position, and the state's criminal code is due to be completely overhauled next year anyway.

Rep. Art Hamilton, a Democrat and one of the legislature's two blacks, had civil liberties qualms about the bill, which he saw as deriving its momentum from the law-and-order camp. He said, "I think people like [ardent feminist Representative] Jo Cauthorn are legitimately upset [about rape prosecutions, but] I think the people at the other end of the spectrum are the same people who pushed rape laws fifty years ago. I just don't think the people who are pushing the bill have any real concern about how rape laws have been used as a tool."

Representative Cauthorn summed up the strange alliance bluntly. "The feminists choose their opportunities when they can, and this came riding in on law and order. I have absolutely no illusions about the level of their awareness. They have an extremely protective attitude toward the victims of crimes and particularly toward women."

The problem with riding on someone else's coattails is that your control of direction is limited. At the end of the legislative session came the traditional vote bartering. The rape bill was firmly in the hands of the law-and-order people, and they firmly dumped it rather than trade for the needed extra support. A female Democratic House aide, who had hopefully followed the bill's progress over the weeks, summed up sardonically: "It just wasn't one of the real biggies as far as trade-offs were concerned."

No complete national summaries of rape-law revision are available, but a recent *New York Times* check of twenty-five states showed that in the past year fifteen of them had lightened the evidentiary burden on rape victims and eight more were considering doing so. In addition, feminist pressure upon police departments and prosecutors to take rape cases seriously is finally showing results. The number of reported rape cases has risen astronomically in many areas as victims come to believe that humiliation is not the only possible result of telling authorities about a rape.

Evidence of increased concern about rape can be found almost everywhere. It was "first on the agenda" at a December meeting of security officers from the Midwest's Big Ten universities. In Portland, Ore. a Rape Victim Advocate Program, funded by $124,132 from the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, has contributed to the quadrupling of rape reports in the area. Under the program, a professional therapist and her staff advise the rape victim from the time the attack is reported until the case goes to trial, if it does. A counselor is present during the police's interview of the victim, and the physical examination is made in a private hospital. Before the program took effect, according to the area's District Attorney, "Rape victims [were] forced to undergo humiliating and searching questions by the police. Clinical examinations of victims were often conducted in merely a small, screened-off section of the booking room. Little wonder that many women refused to report the crimes."

In the matter of attitude, perhaps no change is more important than the increasing willingness of women to challenge the assumption of female culpability that society has cast over the whole area of rape. On every level—from self-defense courses to assault crisis centers to placing women at the head of police and prosecution sex crimes units—women have tired of having men "avenge" rapes and are taking the initiative in coping with, forestalling and prosecuting the crime. This attitudinal change is the more vivid when considered in the light of the well-known proclivity of rape trial defense lawyers to stock juries with older women.

Some rather sharp ironies are being produced by this nascent period, when retributionists and humanists can forge a rare alliance. Consider, for example, that the result of facilitating rape prosecution will be to send more rapists to prison, a "coals to Newcastle" situation of the first order. Prison rapes, of course, do not fit the Tarzan-Jane mold that can be understood by the Phoenix 40.

Consider the case of Inez Garcia, who killed a man who, she claimed, had been an accessory to her rape twenty minutes earlier. Garcia's trial and its intensive press coverage summoned all the demons that will plague the issue of rape for months and years to come. Garcia's attorney, the noted defender of radical causes, Charles Garry, attempted to convince the jury that his client was a chaste, devoutly Catholic woman who was thrown into a state of "diminished capacity" by the rape and who certainly was no threat to kill again. The radical feminists, whose thinking increasingly influenced Garcia, bridled at counsel's argument that the killing was an impaired act, a regrettable act. Rather, they said, rape is a violent act which deserves a violent response. Inez Garcia's action was not deranged but a sane and long-overdue rejection of the passive female role. For his part, the judge kept repeating, "This is a murder trial, not a rape trial," and was totally unsympathetic to the notion that an emotional reaction to a rape could retain its intensity, its avenging intensity, for twenty minutes.

Garcia's supporters, who filled the courtroom daily, raised their voices in approval when she undercut Garry's case by saying, "I'm not sorry I did it. I'm only sorry I missed Luis Castillo [the alleged rapist]. I meant to kill him too. That's the only thing I'm sorry about." The jury was less sympathetic, convicting Garcia of second-degree murder. And the judge, less sympathetic still, sentenced her to five years to life.

Analyses of the trial have centered upon the contrast between Garry's pragmatic approach and the defiant self-reliant approach embodied in Garcia's courtroom outbursts. To some, such as Shana Alexander of *Newsweek*, her radical supporters led her down the path of inexpedient defiance, in effect using her to make a political statement. For others, including the women who have criticized Garry for irrelevantly basing the case on Garcia's putative saintliness and emotional instability, there was only one real issue: a woman has a right to sovereignty over her body, including the right to take whatever steps she must to maintain that sovereignty. In the Garcia case that meant

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

avenging a transgression that had left her emotionally, as well as physically, subjugated. The night before the jury reached its verdict on Garcia, 19-year-old Deborah Jay Kantaeng opened the door of her Long Beach, Calif. house and fired a shotgun at the two men standing there, killing one. She said that she had invited them there after they had raped her at knifepoint several nights before. And, from jail, Inez Garcia evaluated her own trial in this fashion: "A lot of women know about me, they believe in the same idea I do, and they support my idea, and that to me is a victory."

For the time being, Garcia, Kantaeng and their supporters march in step with the likes of Walter McLaughlin who, it will be recalled, became an early hero of the anti-rape movement when in May of 1974, in his capacity of Chief Justice of Boston's Suffolk Superior Court, he caustically reprimanded a jury that had returned an acquittal in a rape case that he felt had merited a conviction. Justice McLaughlin's action was widely reported, and hailed as a harbinger of new official sensitivity to the problems of rape victims. But Justice McLaughlin made it eminently clear in his remarks that his attitude stems from a source that would make most feminists intensely uncomfortable. "If you have no respect for the virtues of our young ladies," the Justice told the jury, "they will get no respect from the rapists that roam our streets."

And the "unvirtuous" young ladies—and the raped male prisoners—how will they go about earning the "respect from rapists" they need? The struggle to understand and deal with rape is just beginning. □

THE TRIDENT FIASCO

Obstacles on the Way to Doomsday

ROBERT C. ALDRIDGE

"I have contacted GAO concerning the report which you requested, but the only report which covers the subject matter you described is classified as SECRET." The above response from my Congressman regarding Trident missile failures shows that the military is still hiding the truth. That SECRET General Accounting Office report, released in part by Wisconsin Rep. Les Aspin, reveals that Lockheed is having double trouble with the Trident I missile, an interim weapon between existing Poseidons and the fully counterforce-capable Trident II.

One of the difficulties lies in combining semi-conductor technologies which are not normally used together. Problems with four of the thirteen types of integrated circuits are compounded by Lockheed's need to bring suppliers up to speed on one or another of the technologies involved. The malfunctioning micro-circuits are used in the flight-control package, the interlocks packages and the command sequencer for the various events that occur during flight. Substitution of more conventional components would increase weight (thus reducing range) as well as weaken radiation hardness to hostile nuclear blasts.

More severe in terms of jeopardizing missile objectives is the difficulty of loading new high-energy rocket fuel into the latest design of lightweight motor casings. Described by Rear Adm. Levering Smith, director of the Strategic Systems Project Office, as "a major weakness situation," he admits: ". . . I recognized that it was the only item in the development that could have brought about a condition that would make a complete failure."

This crisis surfaced when an experimental motor blew up at the Utah test site in May 1973. Since then six more motors that exactly duplicated the known conditions of the faulty specimen were test-fired and two of them detonated. This confirms, claims the Navy, that they know what is causing booster motors to explode. Yet they admit that this is a new phenomenon (propellant porosity apparently develops after the motor starts to burn and is undetectable beforehand), and they feel a need to demonstrate more thoroughly that all aspects are understood in a truly scientific sense. Solving the problem after it is detected is another matter. Adding weight or diluting the propellant will mean a considerable reduction in range. And the name of the game is range—survivability depends upon it, and that is the key selling point of this multibillion-dollar gamble. But range degradation may have already taken place because there are things the Navy is not telling us.

We need not be surprised to learn of program-disrupting flight failures in 1979, as the Trident I missile becomes operational. That eventuality will not be without precedent. The currently deployed Poseidon missile, once touted as having a range in excess of 3 ,000 nautical miles, has now been degraded to only a 2,500-mile capability with full payload, which is no more than that of its predecessor, the Polaris A-3. During twenty-four operational launches more than half the Poseidon missiles failed in one way or another. As Admiral Smith confided to a Senate committee during heavily censored testimony on May 16, 1973: "I have seen enough to believe that it would be appropriate for us to recall essentially all of the missiles that are now deployed, to disassemble and to test various components, perhaps even to tear down some of those components and get at the basic bits and pieces." Admiral Smith recommended that this back-to-the-drawing-board approach be completed within one year.

Smith's superiors, however, did not approve of such drastic action. Instead he was told to bring in a limited number of Poseidon missiles, take them apart, and try to find out what caused the failures. Rear Adm. William F.

Robert Aldridge is a former aerospace engineer with sixteen years' experience on five generations of sea-based missile systems. Now a critic of the arms race, his articles have appeared in many publications.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Clifford, Jr., assistant deputy chief of Naval Operations, stated last March that corrections "have been made and operational testing of Poseidon resumed in October 1974." He adds: "The Navy is cautiously optimistic that Poseidon problems have been overcome, and continued close monitoring of operational tests will be continued to build up a more statistically conclusive picture."

One Pentagon spokesman implied that it would cost more than $100 million to install new, improved missiles to assure combat readiness of Poseidon submarines. Farooq Hussain, co-author of a report on U.K. defense policy published by the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science, estimates that the "more than $100 million" will add up to $2 billion over a three-year period. This, of course, means additional large contracts for defense industries.

But Poseidon's problems really started earlier than that. As the missiles were becoming operational in 1970, re-entry bodies started disintegrating during flight tests. These catastrophic failures appeared consistently while coming in on the shallow re-entry path associated with the longer-range trajectories. Flat re-entry angles allow time for the nose tip to soak up large quantities of heat. A task force was immediately set up to study this phenomenon, and its investigation stretched out for months. I took part in an exercise at Cape Canaveral where we unloaded re-entry bodies from one of the missiles aboard the SSBN *James Madison*—the first Polaris submarine converted to launch Poseidon missiles. After the bodies were carefully removed and disassembled under controlled conditions, the suspected components were subjected to a battery of tests. But to my knowledge the trouble never was resolved, and that is probably why the Poseidon is now rated as only a 2,500-nautical-mile missile.

Seen in this context, Trident troubles are merely a replay of past history. The outcome is predictable: settle for less but don't tell the public until it's paid for. Propulsion and hybrid electronics difficulties, in conjunction with a $70-million cost overrun during fiscal year 1975, have already forced a slip in the first flight date. This in turn brought about a six-month delay in operational availability for the Trident I missile; from October 1978 to April 1979.

More sobering is the fact that Trident I propulsion and electronic technologies are major building blocks for the 6,000-nautical-mile, hard-target-kill Trident II, which holds a key spot in the Administration's loudly proclaimed counterforce doctrine. And those same technologies are needed for Missile-X, a mobile intercontinental weapon with which the Pentagon hopes to start replacing silo-based Minuteman missiles by the mid-1980s.

While the waste of taxpayer dollars by the military is appalling, the global aspects of the arms race are frightening: all life on this planet is endangered by the imminent clash of nuclear weaponry. It only adds irony to misery that these military masterpieces don't really work well. But they continue to reap lavish corporate profits, and the military bureaucracy still thrives. That, it seems, may have been the real objective all along. □

LETTERS

(*Continued from page 98*)

Martin Hall lived to see the end of the war in Vietnam, a goal for which he had long worked, and at the time of his death was chairman of the Los Angeles Peace Council. From 1963-67 he worked in Vienna at the World Institute of Peace. His leadership was both creative and courageous on behalf of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, the Los Angeles Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born and the Association for Friendship and Cultural Relations, USA-USSR. Most recently he was the first American journalist to expose the activities of a Nazi war criminal in the official apparatus of the Chilean junta, in an article widely reprinted in American and foreign newspapers and journals. His many friends in this country and overseas, especially readers in the FGR Cologne *Die Blätter* will miss a man of exceptional critical intelligence, of lifelong involvement in the struggle for human liberation, who had undiminished faith in the ultimate triumph of a Socialist world at peace. *Stephen H. Fritchman*

author's note

The following note was omitted from Elinor Langer's essay on Tess Slesinger in *The Nation* [May 24], and is printed now at the request of the author:

The Unpossessed was published in 1934 by Simon and Schuster. It got good reviews but, like much of the literature of the 1930s, became unavailable quickly, in part because editions were small and the buying public impoverished. In 1955 Murray Kempton referred to it in *Part of Our Time*, implying that it was a thinly disguised allegory of the founding of the *Partisan Review* and that its failed maudlin radicals were identifiable litterateurs, still on the scene. Kempton's account evidently left discomfort behind, because when the 1966 Avon paperback was published it included an Afterword by Lionel Trilling denying that he was represented in the book, but leaving the impression that he was. Trilling praised Slesinger, but awkwardly, surrounding his comments about her with remarks on tangentially related topics, particularly the *Menorah Journal* which, by his own testimony, was more important to himself and to Slesinger's first husband, Herbert Solow, than it was to her. The Avon edition was evidently both scanty and inferior; *The Unpossessed* again quickly became difficult to find. Possibly the current praise for the short stories will stimulate a new edition of the novel.

thank God for OPEC!

Hamilton, Ohio

It has not only reminded us that we are using up irreplaceable natural resources as though there were a prize for getting rid of them; it has also made it obvious that we are governed by lunatics. The Administration tells us that the present price of oil is outrageous, intolerable and equivalent to economic strangulation; therefore we must raise this intolerable price 25 per cent and seek international agreement to keep it high. Domestic supplies of oil and gas are running out, and will be utterly inadequate in another generation; therefore we must restrict imports and exhaust our reserves as fast as possible. A few fields, like Elk Hills and Teapot Dome, which have been held for emergencies, are our only hedge against future catastrophes; therefore we must pump them dry immediately. (Since there is no present shortage of oil, it is proposed to store some of what we pump for future use. But, since storage tanks are expensive, we shall pump it back underground. This permits us to pump it three times and waste a lot.) To make it profitable to produce oil from shale and low-grade coal, it will be necessary to hold domestic energy costs at the equivalent of $15 per barrel of oil—which means that OPEC can bring our whole economy to its knees at any time by selling oil to our competitors for $3 per barrel. . . .

The Congressional response to this challenge has been to reduce the situation to chaos and then propose another enormous federal bureaucracy to perpetuate the chaos. *W. Palmer Taylor*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & THE ARTS

Torture As Public Policy

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON TORTURE. *Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 285 pp. $8.95. Paper $3.45.*

DAVID GLANZ

During the last twenty-five years or so, George Orwell's infamous Room 101 has become an internationally franchised operation. On Human Rights Day, 1972, Amnesty International, an independent, nongovernmental organization which works for the welfare and release of "prisoners of conscience" on a nonpartisan basis—through private letters, pleas to governments, publicity and public protests—initiated a program against the increasingly widespread and systematic use of torture by governments the world over. This sobering 285-page *Report on Torture* was compiled as part of the larger campaign and served originally as source material for Amnesty International's Conference for the Abolition of Torture, held in Paris in December 1973; it has just now been published in the United States.

The book's central message is that "torture has virtually become a worldwide phenomenon and that the torturing of citizens regardless of sex, age, or state of health in an effort to retain political power is a practice encouraged by some governments and tolerated by others in an increasingly large number of countries." In a thoughtful and lucid style, the report discusses the historical aspects of torture and the problem of legal definition. It then reviews the medical and psychological aspects of torture, deals with legal remedies, offers a world survey of the incidence of torture. Finally, it presents its conclusions, along with a bibliography on the subject.

Article 5 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, "No one shall be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." The notion of inalienable human rights is at the core of the prohibition against torture. This concept is based, the book contends, "on man's long experience as a social and moral being who developed increasingly humane standards out of his belief in the dignity and integrity of each human being." Unfortunately, as Robert Shelton, a free-lance journalist, has noted in an article on political prisoners throughout the world (with much of his material supplied by Amnesty International), the increasing possibilities of conflict between individuals and the modern state creates the potential for the use of torture for suppressing political dissent. Yet there is no doubt the authors of this study are correct in their insistence that "no act is more a contradiction of our humanity than the deliberate infliction of pain on another, the deliberate attempt over a period of time to kill a man without his dying."

Faced with the problem of developing an adequate legal definition of torture, the Amnesty International report stresses four essential elements: involvement of at least two persons, the torturer and the victim; the infliction of acute pain and suffering; the deliberate effort to break the victim's will; and torture as a systematic activity with a rational purpose. The authors observe that the proponents of the so-called "doctrine of the sliding-scale," which holds the state should possess the right to escalate its means of interrogation the greater the threat to its security, do not advocate torture outright, but methods that occupy the "gray area." It is in this area, of "ill-treatment," "degrading" or "inhuman" treatment, that the definition of torture is particularly weak. Nonetheless, despite the limited amount of jurisprudence on the subject of torture, the report concludes "it can safely be stated . . . that under all circumstances, regardless of the context [i.e., war, civil war] in which it is used, torture is outlawed under the common law of mankind. This being so, its use may properly be considered to be a crime against humanity."

Recent studies of pain and stress have led to increasing acceptance of a unified concept of the mind-body relationship, which "prevents one from cataloguing torture methods and effects according to discrete categories of the physical and psychological." As a result, the *Amnesty International Report on Torture*, while noting the distinction between "third-degree methods" (such as physical assault with a rubber hose) and "fourth-degree methods" (as in promoting psychological disorientation by means of sensory deprivation), concentrates less on techniques than on the overall character of the torture situation and on the short- and long-term effect on the participants.

"At present, there exist few effective ways of stopping torture." Legal remedies are generally neither available nor effective in most instances, since freedom from outside interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nation-states, as a principle of the international system, stands in opposition to the notion of fundamental human rights and international protection of those rights.

Because of its character as a political entity, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights has been unable to enforce Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On a regional level, the European Convention on Human Rights was able to take action in the case of Greece, but it is practically the only regional organization concerned with such issues. Nongovernmental groups have been the most vigorous participants in the defense of human rights and in condemning torture. By collecting and disseminating information about torture, sending investigators to the countries concerned, sending observers to trials where the issue of torture is likely to be raised by the accused, lobbying with those who can influence governments that employ torture, and working to strengthen human rights protection, nongovernmental organizations have had an effect in many individual cases. But as the report points out, "the state remains the key element, not only in the sense that it is the offending party, but also in that at the international level most efforts are designed to persuade states to exert their influence on the offending state."

Three case studies are presented in the report. The first is a very brief, 2-page account of the role of the U.N. in the occupied territories in the Middle East where, since the Special Committee consisted entirely of countries having no diplomatic relations with Israel, the Israeli Government refused to cooperate. In the case of the use of torture in Greece, from 1967 to 1973, the report offers a much more detailed analysis of the regional and international response. Ironically, although Greece was ultimately expelled from the Council of Europe for its violation of basic human rights, apparently it was the United States that was in the best position to put pressure on the Greek Government to abandon the use of torture as an administrative practice. The third case study is a review of the findings of the British Government's actions in Northern Ireland by both official government groups and an inquiry conducted by Amnesty International itself.

The bulk of the report is a kind of Cook's Tour of Torture, surveying the situation in sixty-four countries. The authors stress the fact that availability and re-

David Glanz has written for Society, *the* Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Newsletter of the Democratic Left *and* Midstream.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liability of the evidence adduced varies widely, and they make it clear that the omission of any country from the study does not imply a clean bill of health. In Africa, South Africa remains the most prominent example of torture as a feature of administrative policy; in that country it is inflicted upon common law offenders as well as political prisoners. But well-documented cases of torture have been reported in Tunisia, Morocco, Malawi, Uganda and other African states. Accurate information on the status of human rights is unavailable for China, North Korea, Thailand and other parts of Southeast Asia. Torture does not appear to be the standard practice in India as it does in Indonesia. The situation obtaining in South Vietnam before the end of the civil war is of course well known; the motto of the Saigon police, "*Knong danh cho co*" ("If they are not guilty, beat them until they are"), the Project Phoenix assassination program and the routine torture of political prisoners are now matters of common knowledge. Until recently, torture was also a routine practice in Portugal, and it appears to be so still in Spain. Little evidence is available on the status of human rights in Eastern Europe, while in Russia, imprisonment in labor camps and forcible commitment to psychiatric hospitals are the principal forms of dealing with political dissidents. The situation is perhaps worst in Latin America, where Brazil and Argentina have institutionalized the practice of torture on a wide scale and have also actively exported their expertise, most recently to Chile. Strong evidence exists that torture is common in the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Uruguay, El Salvador and Guatemala. Finally, the report states that cases of torture have been documented in Iran, Iraq and Syria, while allegations of ill-treatment of Arabs by Israeli occupation forces are as yet unresolved.

Torture is one activity a state is loath to admit. Nevertheless, when justifications of torture are offered, they generally rest on the argument of a lesser evil for a greater good: "It is the only way to. . . ." It is important to recognize that arguments on the inefficiency of torture as a means of securing information ignore the fact that in its major use today—as a means of deterring political action and open dissent—the information-gathering aspect of torture is irrelevant.

As the authors of the study remind us, "the prohibition of torture as a *universal value* is a recent achievement. . . . Torture is the most flagrant denial of man's humanity, it is the ultimate human corruption." For anyone concerned with the condition of human rights in the world today, the *Amnesty International Report on Torture* is a document worthy of serious consideration. It is only through the efforts of groups like Amnesty International that we can hope to prevent Orwell's grim vision from becoming a reality. □

Our Political 'Criminals'

ANGELA DAVIS: An Autobiography. *Random House. 400 pp. $8.95.*

ON DOING TIME. *By Morton Sobell. Charles Scribner's Sons. 525 pp. $10.95.*

THE MORNING BREAKS: The Trial of Angela Davis. *By Bettina Aptheker. International Publishers. 228 pp. $9.50. Paper $3.75.*

PEGGY DENNIS

It is not their similarities but their differences that make comparison so compelling between the Morton Sobell and Angela Davis books and, with them, Bettina Aptheker's account of Angela Davis' trial.

Morton Sobell is probably right in observing that Ethel and Julius Rosenberg could not, in the 1960s, have been executed nor he be sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment on the charge of conspiring to be "atom bomb spies," as they were in the 1950s. It is probably also true that Angela Davis could not have been acquitted in the 1950s, as she was in 1972, of the charge of conspiring to commit kidnapping and murder at the Marin County courthouse in Northern California in August 1970. For political trials, like the mass movements and the repressions they reflect, are rooted in the social and political conditions of their time, and the guilt or innocence of the victims has little to do with the outcome of such trials.

The Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell were casualties of the hysteria-ridden McCarthyism of the 1950s which almost succeeded in totally routing progressive, liberal and Left organizations. The acquittal of Angela Davis and the numerous hung juries, case dismissals and reversals of convictions involving anti-war and black militants were rooted in a different era—that of the 1960s, when a young generation turned from traditional protest to active resistance against the war, racism, sexism and corrupt social and political institutions. Under their impact, radical and revolutionary ideas penetrated deeply into the consciousness of millions.

After nearly two decades in prison, Morton Sobell emerged in 1969, a living "pre-historic" link to that 1950s past. His had not been the 1960s prison world of Soledad, San Quentin or Attica. On arriving at the formidable Alcatraz, Sobell notes, "All the men seemed so subdued that it was frightening, like a tomb of living souls." And he decided, "Morty, you mustn't begin to live your life here, for that would be certain death." Devoid of political histrionics, his is a simple, personal account of a determination to do his time holding on to sanity, humanness, reality. Regrettably missing is a clear-cut delineation of the political climate that buried him in that tomb. Yet as the personal story of a prime victim of that climate, Sobell's account is a moving indictment of the era.

Growing up in a radical Jewish family on New York's East Side, Sobell became a City College anti-Fascist, a desultory Communist for a short time, a minor government employee like thousands of other bright young people who flocked to Washington in the liberal New Deal days. The very ordinariness of his 1930s-40s life points up the frightening fact that the web McCarthyism spun around him could easily have caught someone else. And it did catch thousands—with, of course, lesser consequences, except for the consequences to Ethel and Julius Rosenberg.

Unlike Sobell, Angela Davis insists that hers is a political autobiography. Nevertheless, it is as a personal story that her account is particularly interesting. As a political document, it leaves important matters undefined and unexplored.

Black, young, alienated and painfully aware of her token status in our white-controlled society, for more than a decade Angela Davis was a participant in a somewhat isolated elitist academia. From the prestigious, experimental Elizabeth Irwin High School in New York she went on to Brandeis in Massachusetts, and thereafter to the Sorbonne in Paris and the University of Frankfurt in West Germany. Ultimately she progressed to a youthful radicalism acquired in part from contact with the sons and daughters of Communists in New York. That led her to take part in anti-war demonstrations in Europe, Black Student Union activity at the University of California (San Diego), militant black power commitment in SNCC and the Black Panther Party in Los Angeles. In 1968 she joined the Communist Party.

That was an odd moment for a young black militant to join the Communist Party, which was not at the time a strong magnet for white or black young people. A four-year effort inside the party had just failed to modify the harsh official line of

Peggy Dennis is a free-lance journalist and critic working in the San Francisco Bay Area. A former foreign editor of People's World *in California, she was active in defense committees of victims of McCarthyism during the 1950s.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opposition to the new 1960s resistance movements. Divisions within the international Communist movement which had come to the surface in 1956 were being further exacerbated by the mounting crisis over Czechoslovakia. The New Left white and black liberation movements were then heatedly debating strategic, ideological, tactical and philosophical questions. A serious analytical view of the reasons why she left these militant resistance movements to join the Communist Party would be significant for the reader's understanding of Angela Davis' political development; such an analysis would be essential in defining the 1960s decade—at least as she saw it. However, this political autobiography passes lightly over the decisive moment in the author's political life.

The same issues continued to develop after Angela Davis became a Communist, and she must have had to deal with them in her relations with her party and with her non-party comrades in the black movements. Little inkling of any of this is given in her account, however. There were, too, the varying views of young Jonathan and George Jackson as either misguided, desperate victims or martyred heroes whose revolutionary acts were part of the new kinds of struggle; the debates over the strategy of Angela Davis' own trial; the differing roads of nationalism, separatism, Pan-Africanism, black-white unity; the relationships of Communists to Marxists and revolutionaries who do not join the Communist Party. All these questions must have affected her deeply. But we don't know because she does not share her views with us in her book.

The trial procedures of the Sobell and Davis cases point up a further contrast between the eras in which they occurred. In the only mildly bitter part of his book, Sobell writes of the ineptness of his attorneys and his own amazing isolation from his defense. Not consulted and indeed rarely seen by his attorneys, he was confronted in court with actions he could not agree with. His confused pliancy is difficult to credit, but even more unbelievable is the obvious inability of his attorneys to cope with the case. The cold-war aspects of the charges hung like a pall over legal and mass-action defense activities alike.

In contrast, Angela Davis' brief descriptions and Bettina Aptheker's detailed account of the 1972 trial reveal a highly capable team of black and white attorneys working closely with a dedicated defense committee, all in constant touch with Angela Davis—even in her prison cell during the sixteen months of confinement before she won the fight for bail.

Aptheker brings to her graphic narrative of that legal and public fight the drama of her own close involvement as Angela Davis' friend, as a member of the defense committee and as a member, together with Davis, of their party's central committee. All the more disappointing, then, is the fact that her long chronicle of minutiae, interesting as it is, is not pulled together by a political evaluation. There is no explanation of the objective factors that made victory possible nor any examination of the important issues involved in the debates that took place over trial strategy. A mere description of what happened, hour by hour, just isn't good enough for a trial of that importance.

The Sobell and Davis trials had one striking similarity, despite my emphasis upon their many differences. Like all political trials in a country that does not admit the existence of political prisoners or political trials, the real issues were not confronted in the courtroom. A cold-war hysteria that required sacrificial victims in the 1950s became, in the courtroom, a debate over Jello box tops and console tables bought at Macy's. And fear of the new revolutionary movement in the prison system among blacks and Chicanos in 1970 became, in the courtroom, a debate over who did or did not see Angela Davis in a van or an airport waiting room at a specific moment. All the more essential, then, that the political meaning of these experiences be made clear. □

Myths of Sustained Disorder

PYRAMIDS OF SACRIFICE: Political Ethics and Social Change. *By Peter L. Berger. Basic Books. 242 pp. $10.*

MARTIN LEBOWITZ

At the time of his death, Walter Lippmann was writing a book tentatively called *The Ungovernability of Man.* In a review of the behaviorist B.F. Skinner, Noam Chomsky maintained that the behavioral sciences—by implication including sociology, economics and politics—are essentially unscientific in that they have little or no predictive content; they fall short of exerting rational control. Obviously, too, the discovery of nuclear energy has created a world less susceptible of order and management than the world that preceded it. We have paradoxically departed—in spite of the growth of scientific method and the many sciences—from the Baconian philosophy that knowledge is power.

Sociologists often speak of technology, together with bureaucracy, as a uniquely modern source of power. Yet the true spirit of modernity is doubtless summed up by Hegel, for whom knowledge is not a form of power but of *existence,* of a reality that is human and purposeful yet ultimately paradoxical, inscrutable and transcendental. Peter Berger's book begins by affirming twenty-five theses, one of which is that "it is, in principle, impossible to 'raise the consciousness' of anyone, because all of us are stumbling around on the same level of consciousness—a pretty dim level." Berger's chief area of interest and expertise is the sociology of religion, and is obviously rooted, historically and intellectually, in Hegel's philosophy. Indeed, the belief that consciousness is necessarily appropriate to its objective determinants at any given time or place is typical of the kind of Hegelianism that the author admires.

Berger's central theme is that, underlying the two major current systems, capitalism and socialism, are the two powerful myths of growth and revolution. Both myths must be debunked. He concedes that capitalism has achieved unprecedented productivity, together with institutions favoring individual freedom. Nevertheless, case by case, these achievements must be weighed against the human costs. Those consist not merely of the murder and imprisonment of political dissidents. Rather, Berger invokes two classical concepts of sociology to describe the development of the industrial system: "anomie" and "rationalization." Anomie, a term introduced by Emile Durkheim, reflects the loss in modern society of the framework of meanings without which neither collective nor individual life is possible. Rationalization was defined by Max Weber as "modernization" in accordance with imperatives associated with capitalism, an economic system demanding procedures and mental attitudes that are calculating, prognosticating and precisely controlling. Rationalization means that the individual's life becomes increasingly regulated, administered, "engineered." Berger suggests that anomie and rationalization are profoundly related, causing an individual and collective destructiveness resulting precisely from a "reality loss."

For example, he suggests that the facile identification of crime, big business, government and even the professions in the movie *The Godfather: Part*

Martin Lebowitz has contributed to The Journal of Philosophy, The Kenyon Review *and other publications, and to two anthologies:* The Critics' Notebook *(University of Minnesota) and* The Kenyon Critics *(World).*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Il probably reveals an eternal facet of human nature: the irony of ruthless corruption not only as an expression of unprincipled power but also as a status symbol. A further irony is that, at the heart of this baleful economic evolution is possibly the work ethic, the myth of *homo faber*. The final irony is that a consequence of the specious "rationality" of capitalism is increasing disorder. The thesis is not without Marxian overtones—and Freudian ones. Society itself becomes an iniquitous family, in respect to anomie and rationalization.

Berger remarks at one point that sociological definitions tend to be arbitrary, and he explicitly raises the question whether, in the matter of Third World development, capitalist and Socialist patterns are in reality different, so far as each expresses the plan of an all-powerful government. There is indeed a sense in which the author's vision of man is that he is a mythopoeic creature even in his seemingly realistic social endeavors, in which he appears to be innately destructive. Berger's consciousness of human destructiveness intensifies his humanitarian concern. He repeatedly affirms, for example, that policy should seek to avoid the infliction of pain, citing the fact that Brazil, the largest example of capitalist development in the Third World, and China, the most important Socialist country, both anticipate the sacrifice of at least a generation for the achievement of their respective goals. Most characteristically, he is in principle opposed to the opinion that human costs (of, for instance, a terrorist regime) are interpretable as necessary and temporary aspects of the revolutionary process. Above all, "it is high time for Americans to surrender their grandiose self-definitions, whether in the positive vision of their society as 'God's own country,' or in the masochistic inversion of this vision in which America becomes the Beast from the Abyss."

According to Berger and other sociologists, modernization is a shift from givenness to choice on the level of meaning. More often than in any earlier age, accordingly, men deliberately make evil decisions. By the same token, it means that the grounds of justification are increasingly vague and equivocal. In consequence it would appear that a social philosophy dedicated to harmony, order and reason is not only acceptable but necessary. We are psychologically incapable of surrendering our democratic freedoms and immunities, but it does seem that of the two alternative systems, capitalism and socialism, the latter fares better precisely as a result of Berger's argument. □

ARCHITECTURE / JANE HOLTZ KAY

It was a cold bleak day on the beach when we circled the houses at Amagansett last fall. Where architectural reputations had been made, financial ones were being undermined: the much-lauded beach houses there, near the tip of Long Island, bore invisible "For Sale" signs, we knew. It was barren in all ways as we walked about, peering in at the six-figure world of "The Five."

"The Five" were architects of a day that some might pine for now, so distant is half a decade in the faddish world of the New York architectural vanguard. They were (still are, of course) five designers. The trendy group of architects was hired here and elsewhere by the economic entrepreneurs of the early 1970s, and thereafter given more academic exposure in exhibitions and a book named for the group. Magazine articles took tours of their palaces and spent pages to divide their ranks into the Blacks, the Grays and the Whites—categories meaningful to something less than the full number of those who seek shelter.

To me, the collection by the beach that day was dismal beyond the season, and even now that the summer has brought the owners back to their cutaway cubes, it remains so. These latter-day members of the "400" seem to live less well in their conspicuous designs than did those housed in Newports and Bar Harbors past. If this is the ideal, no wonder the domestic norm is so dreary.

Behind the dollar signs evoked by these set pieces lies the reality of the *place*: the freaky artifacts of early 1970s architecture, draped in utility lines, might have been packaged at Levittown, so crowded is this watering hole, so awkward the relation of parts to whole.

At the time of design, the five architects and their peers claimed that the frenzied geometry of their forms sprang from the needs of their clients. Only this spring, though, one of their number, Richard Meier, admitted the sham to Harvard design students: "In the past I talked about the relation of form to program," he said. "I was really interested in the relation of form to form." Indeed, it was high-cost sculpture. The business of staking out a piece of beach comes dear. Add to that the flourishes of these woodsy Neo-Victorian forms and the whiter-than-white Corbusier reconstructions. Yet because there is no symbiosis between the land and the landed, between one house and its neighbor on these sand dunes better left bare—because of this, the architectural flourishes enrich their inhabitants little more than the "all elec. kitchens" humanize the tract house of the developer.

Mean or flamboyant, all domestic architecture is dwindling these days. Architects create few extravaganzas any more; nor is their "debased" form, the single-family home, being built. It is the slowest season ever for the private dwelling. One doesn't have to read the advertisements ("Extraordinary contemporary. Just finished with Great Finesse") or see the hand-wringing lobbyists of the National Homebuilders Association to know. And the data show a shrinkage that predates today's economic depression. A new report from the Harvard-M.I.T. Joint Center for Urban Studies confirms that the single-family home has been in a decline for a decade: "The single-family share of total new construction dropped steadily from 66 per cent between 1960 and 1964 to 55 per cent between 1965 and 1969 and to 47 per cent between 1970 and 1973," according to the latest Joint Center report. "It's a slow death" for the house on a lot, concedes co-author Reilly Atkinson.

The major mode of American architectural life was fattened by federal mortgages and federal highway building; federal catering to the car brought us the flowering of suburban shelter. The single-family figure rose to 75 per cent after World War II, but as the above figures show, it dropped by close to 30 per cent even before current money troubles, and must have dwindled still more since.

The one-family one-lot myth is fading at the highest and lowest levels—as is the notion of cheap land, cheap taxes, cheap money—all cheap resources. With $41,300 the median price of houses and $35,600 the average, only one out of five American families has the estimated $21,170 income to buy them, the Joint Economic Committee reported to Congress this spring.

That said, how does our architecture reflect the decline of the long-prevailing mode? Barely at all, is the answer. Architects remain as obsessed as other Americans with the isolated individual dwelling.

CROW'S CATASTROPHE

Crow squawks at the rain spirits
Tearing out his feathers.
Stirring up the leaves,
Wind whips once, twice, three
Times around his body.

His toes wired to the cold.
Inside, we almost feel guilty
We're not this mourning crow,
Storm's caw-eyed little brother,
Riding out another joke.

Duane Niatum

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Is Europe only 7 hours ahead of us?



In Britain, television watchers will soon be tuning in to an electronic newspaper which will allow them to read the news on their TV screens.

In France, the government now has a Secretary of State for the Condition of Women.

In Germany, there's a plan to place workers at the center of economic decision making by requiring that labor is represented on the boards of industrial corporations.

In Denmark, the ballet is so well subsidized that it is said the "artists and staff positively bask in tax money."

In Sweden, there are no slums, no one is poverty stricken or without assistance in times of illness or accident, and everyone can look forward to a secure old age.

Quite obviously, all these countries know something we don't. The United States cannot be secure in the claim that we are foremost in social and technological progress. And the more we learn about what's being done in other countries, the more we can apply that knowledge to our own.

But where do you get news of these developments?

Rarely through our own press, which barely has time and space to cover domestic affairs.

You could subscribe to a lot of foreign newspapers, but then you'd need translators and more time to spend on reading than you could possibly manage.

There's one good, solid source for information about major developments not only in Europe, but in all the countries of the world.

It's called *Atlas World Press Review*.

Atlas has one serious goal: to keep you informed on what is happening outside America, by bringing you the best of the world's press.

Each month we cull articles and items from more than 1,000 foreign publications. (We read them all, so you won't have to, and we translate when necessary.) From London to Zurich to New Delhi to Moscow to Tokyo and beyond, we present the views of each country's most influential papers and magazines. *The Times* of London. *Le Figaro. Der Spiegel. La Prensa. The Peking Daily News. Pravda.*

In fascinating articles, departments, cartoons, and an absorbing monthly "Atlas Report" we focus on issues like The Mideast, Women Today, Abortion, "Oil Shock," Recession, and The Future of the UN. And we give a clear picture of what other nations think of us.

On Henry Kissinger: "There are [in Kissinger] kernels of Metternich, plus others of Casanova and, in unguarded moments, of the Marquis de Sade." (*Excelsior*, Mexico)

On Gerald Ford: "Mr. Ford looks as if he might be the most conservative American president since Hoover in 1929-33, and just might have the same economic consequences." (*The Economist*, England)

What do our readers think of *Atlas*?

Walter Cronkite: "We need this supplemental information from abroad more than ever. . ."

Isaac Asimov: "Absolutely vital [so] we may react to the world as it is . . ."

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: "Little would seem more necessary now . . ."

Alvin Toffler: "First-aid for culture-blindness . . ."

Subscribe now and you can get 9 issues of *Atlas* for just $9.

We think you'll agree *Atlas* is the best source for reliable, concise, and representative coverage of world news and opinion.

ATLAS WORLD PRESS REVIEW P.O. BOX 2550 • BOULDER, COLO. 80302

Please enter my subscription at your Special Introductory Rate
9 issues for just $9.00 (saving $2.25 off the newsstand rate)

Name _____
please print

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

☐ Payment enclosed. ☐ Bill me. Bill to: ☐ Bank Americard

Credit Card No. _____ ☐ Master Charge

Expiration Date _____ Outside the U.S. and Canada add $2.25

If Master Charge enter 4-digit Interbank No. shown above your name. _____



5047

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

True, the single-family home was America's claim to architectural individuality and superiority of life style—as were the car and the highway. Our vaunted living standard was based partly on the fact that the European single-family home was costing three or four times the U.S. price. But the boast didn't take in the reality: that one could not buy the amenities of their older cities, their parks, plazas, walking places, good transit, for love or money. Nor did it reckon with the current doomsday calculations on the cost of the greedy consumption of resources—land, lumber, energy—promoted by the single-family life style. With a new balance sheet, we see these costs.

But the paradox of the old attitude toward the environment is this: as the real number and real meaning of the single dwelling declines, the literature grows. In the twilight hour of what has been called "the most personal and consistent symbol of cultural aspirations from the Revolution until World War I" we make obeisance to a bygone idol, and one increasingly irrelevant to masses of Americans.

There are, to be sure, reasons. "A cathedral is a house for a god; a palace is a house for a king." Another reason lies in the new intellectualization of low culture: no expression of popular art is too trivial now. We downplay the monumental modes of our churches, libraries, castles; we elevate folk forms. And what could be more of the folk than its homes—America's most indigenous "art"?

The single-family house is also the young architect's sketch pad. Big projects don't come until maturity in this late-in-life profession. The work of Mies, Corbusier, all the greats, bore fruit in their later years; meanwhile, the early houses foretold their hopes. Some private home for friend or family is a dress rehearsal, done in moonlight hours. It allows freedom of expression. There is less social cost for invention: pure play can go on (though the current in-game humor shows precious little romping and, to me, displays more of chic than comic wit).

Finally, this doting on the one-family house against the ever more collective reality, may spring from nostalgia. From idle hours in which to theorize, too. In all the arts—literature, painting, music—great periods of creativity are followed by periods of recapitulation and analysis. If the 1950s and 1960s were a physical flowering, the current contemplation and eclectic borrowing are a measure of the no-growth era.

Recapitulation is O.K.; polemics have a place. Yet this architectural analysis is intelligible to so few. On the one hand, we see the high-style art of Amagansett and other princedoms battling it out in the trade press. On the other, a folksy element, equally off the mainstream of human dwelling, comes out in popular counter-culture paperbacks.

All this is indeed a war of words, with glossy pictures. And the fact that the printed page is the turf for such conflict underlines its remove. Developers don't stop for contemplation; they develop. As the United States witnesses the closing of a certain frontier in its domestic design, our political and social seers are silent on the issue. Worse still, our design minds ignore it. Frederick Jackson Turner recorded the closing of the continent's physical frontier; our architectural theorists and architects ignore today's parallel waning, and their most attended thinkers—Vincent Scully, for instance—still look introvertedly at *The Shingle Style Today* (Braziller), the sculpted houses along the New York-New Haven axis, as they relate to the past.

The trouble is that all these odes to intersecting planes that span private streams prevent thought in the public-political sphere—on spaces between buildings, on urban continuity, on parks and communal buildings, on the way people relate to their interior architecture, on apartments and all manner of collecting houses, even on urban homesteading, recycling (to give it the glamour name), and condominium purchase. If we are to live in denser multiple dwellings, we had better look at architectural togetherness, at how to frame humanely a less sprawling, self-energizing, car-free environment.

"Shall we forever resign the pleasures of construction to the carpenter? What does architecture amount to in the experience of the mass of men? I never in all my walks came across a man engaged in so simple and natural an occupation as building his own house," wrote Thoreau.

Perhaps we should look at this too. Yet in Thoreau's architectural heirs, those who espouse the lone home as do-it-yourself architecture, we find the same split from reality. At the opposite pole from the sculptural theorists already mentioned, these would-be Natural Men are as out of touch as the architects of the New York vanguard. The popularity of their texts (*Woodstock Handmade Houses*, Random House's blatant copy of Scrimshaw's better West Coast *Handmade Houses: A Guide to the Woodbutcher's Art*) attests to a hankering for the rough-hewn and the handmade—even as the possibilities for individual eccentricity fade. Their romance with the craggy, shaggy structures goes on as if we could beat our pens into ploughshares and transport a paper society of computer experts and insurance salesmen to the ever less woodsy woods.

Whole Earth and California-cultured, this architectural message is for those who have "more time than money," in the words of Lloyd Kahn, author of the *Domebook*. For its de-technologizing aspects, it has much appeal, as do its elegantly photographed houses. Hammer-and-saw construction, like "the sound of 100,000 Chinese brooms sweeping snow off Peking streets," is music to its advocates' ears. This anti-machine ethic pervaded the "shirt-sleeve sessions" recorded recently in the loose-leaf style collection of *The Responsive House* (M.I.T. Press). But the orthodoxy of these anti-design romantics can be as cloying and sentimental as the in-game polemics of the *aficionados* of the overdesigned.

"You haven't anything to do and I haven't anything to do so we'll just build a house," Bernard Maybeck, an early residential architect in California told his carpenter back in the 1900s when such words really meant something. "We'll lay it out together." Nowadays when it's harder to book a carpenter than a doctor—and still harder to break through building codes to do it yourself legally—such naturalism is painfully forced. In the 19th century, there was Andrew J. Downing's Pattern book—the carpenter-builder could pick from its parts. Today, as architect-theorist Clifford Alexander points out, the real act of doing your own thing is re-creating rather than creating: it is clean-up, fix-up. Repairs and additions equal "more than three times the combined totals of such giant builders as National Homes, Levitt, Boise Cascade and Kaufman and Broad," he reports in *The Responsive House*. We hear too little of this world: it lies beyond picture-book architecture with its talk of "liberating the classic design that lay cringing under layers of bad taste." In the neo-primitive folk cult of *Woodstock* houses, Ivy League backpackers exalt old wood, found parts, hand finishes; in the neo-Corbusian cult, we have apostrophes to the bygone *avant-garde* (the railings of ocean liners of the 1920s as cult). Try to find a human being—or an adaptable way of life—in the texts of either.

The most ingratiating of the house-building theorists who fly in the face of the dwindling form is architect Charles Moore. In *The Place of Houses* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston), Moore, Gerald Allen and Donlyn Lyndon seek to emulate Downing's pattern book, picking and choosing and, above all, placing houses civilly with one another as in a Booth Tarkington idyll. The historically allusive style, vigorously enacted in their own work, is to be intellectually grounded in this text, one supposes.

In a pleasingly low-key way, the three architects suggest ways to build and inhabit houses. We are not to learn from Las Vegas' gaudy commerce, but from more congenial towns like Edgartown, Santa Barbara and their own contemporary classic Sea Ranch development (by MLTW: Moore, Lyndon, Turnbull, Whittaker).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Such places "demonstrate, encouragingly, that houses built in concert, and with care, make towns where it is a great pleasure to be. But," as the author-architects concede, "they indicate too how increasingly difficult it is to find that area of human agreement which allows houses to be built in concert."

Notwithstanding that, Moore, Allen and Lyndon try in their book to promote the single-family house, piece by piece, into a happy whole. There is a good division of shelter-making into the Order of Rooms, Machines and Dreams; there is a fine summary of siting too ("Fitting a house to the land—merging, claiming, enfronting, and surrounding—provide broad categories into which all the good houses we know can be classified"). Plumbing and planning alike are touched. Finally, the place allotted to dreams and visions is just what one would expect from the fairy-tale charms of Moore's own architecture.

This said, one still wonders for what fractional public they write. For, again, it seems quite unlikely that this broader vision of one free-standing house related amenably, structure by structure, to the next will work. Unless the sound notions of this book can be grafted onto something larger, if equally accommodating, few will profit.

A survey this spring by *Professional Builder* indicated that 92.7 per cent of 800 respondents wanted the single-family home, despite all the nay-saying realists. Since that wish remains an impossible and impoverishing dream for so many, we need especially engaging alternatives—not moony-eyed reminiscences. In other lands, more communal solutions do offer other visions. (Moore, et al, have themselves designed multiple units.) The Swedish New Towns, built along transit stops with common day-care, shops and shared facilities, are well-known alternatives, as is Finland's long-standing Tapiola with its rolling hills and apartments. Our own Restons and Columbias simply replicate suburbia's house on the lot—few new dreams there. And elsewhere builders move toward denser styles of group living and multiple housing that are devoid of imagination and ruled by profit and loss.

The residential style in this country sprang from the desire to separate work and play—to retreat (first via streetcar, then via the more destructive automobile) to a land of cultivated calm. Today's world is too interdependent for that, too short of fuel for power-hungry building. The suburb, homogeneous and segregated, is as deficient as the wasted city: its insular dwellings and the rhetoric that surrounds this domestic architecture point to that sterility. And the question remains: if our architects, our supposed visionaries, go on doodling worn-out dreams, who will draw the models for the new myths and Main Streets we need? □

THEATRE / Harold Clurman

London

Ancient Greek wisdom held that no man's life could be judged a happy one till its very end. To a certain extent the same may be said to be true of playwrights. There is still for me the "question" of Harold Pinter, of Joe Orton, of Tom Stoppard.

Pinter, now 45, is already accounted by many a "classic." I have admired *The Birthday Party, The Caretaker, The Homecoming, A Slight Ache* and several other of his short plays. Orton, the author of three full-length plays and some lesser ones, died at the age of 34 and is still a moot figure. Two of his plays enjoyed a modicum of success in England and have given rise to a sort of cult, but only his last play, *What the Butler Saw,* met a favorable Off-Broadway response with us. His reputation is now being enhanced here by a series of revivals. John Lahr, his American champion, is at work on a biography intended to stimulate greater appreciation of his contribution to the theatre of our time. And Tom Stoppard is at present the bright star of the English stage.

All three—Pinter, Orton, Stoppard—it goes without saying, are writers of marked talent, but I am still uncertain as to the "weight" or full measure of their talents. I do not propose to determine whether or not they are "great" playwrights; that question hardly interests me in regard to contemporary writers, for as I have repeatedly affirmed, apart from the fact that "greatness" is not only an ambiguous and relative term, there have been very few indubitably great dramatists in the history of literature. What chiefly concerns me about a playwright—besides momentary entertainment—is his essential human or social impact, his bearing on our present life.

What I have just said pertains particularly to my latest visit to London. I do not wish to write complete reviews of the plays I saw, if for no other reason than that several of them will probably be produced in New York during the 1975-76 season. I examined them for the most part in view of "questions" about their authors in general as well as about what they reflected of the English "scene" or state of being. If in this tricky task I should prove egregiously mistaken, well then, as the fellow said, sue me!

What struck me as I watched Orton's *Entertaining Mr. Sloane* (1964), his first and perhaps most characteristic play (which I had not seen during its brief run in New York) and *Loot* (1964) which I had disliked in its equally brief local engagement, was an ever increasing overall atmosphere of grubbiness and decay which has marked English dramaturgy since 1956. This has little to do with the fact that the working class has since then, and almost for the first time, become thematically central to the English stage. I do not think of Arnold Wesker's early plays, for instance, as "grubby," nor does the adjective really apply to such plays as David Storey's *Home* or *The Contractor.* Those deal with lowly, dejected, sometimes wretched people, but they do not strike one as intrinsically soiled. Orton's depraved milieu is made a subject of mirth. *Entertaining Mr. Sloane* is more or less a joke, *Loot* and to a still greater extent *What the Butler Saw* (in which the characters are middle class or functionaries) are entirely farcical.

Are these plays satires? To a considerable degree, yes. But there is something nasty, not to say malevolent, in Orton's talent. He appears to take a sickly pleasure in his people's degradation. There is almost more enjoyment than castigation in the sadism and foulness of the environment he depicts. The English audience goes for them because they are devilishly well written, because, too, in the instance of *Sloane* that fine actress Beryl Reid adds a note of abject pathos to her slightly caricatured performance, and because there is a certain truth or mirroring of nature, the nature of the moment—but they are not encompassingly true. The laughter they provoke is yellow. They excise a sense of what remains of worthiness, if not in the characters themselves then at least in our most profound consciousness of existence—without which satire is self-vilification and thus destructive of both the object and the onlooker. Such plays indicate a failure of will and stamina.

Since the English are, broadly speaking, a cultivated people, their writers are uncommonly clever. Though Tom Stoppard is a Czech by birth, his plays are eminently English and he is brilliantly adept as well as highly cultivated. He is certainly entertaining. Besides his shrewd theatrical sportiveness there is in him an itch to communicate matters of philosophical import. But he never makes it. There is a stoppage in his thinking and feeling so that his plays, however serious their intent, finally prove hollow. This too is a sign of the times in England—and no doubt elsewhere.

Perhaps Stoppard is to be seen in the most favorable light if we take him in a mood of debonair frivolity. This is surely how to view his latest conceit, *Travesties.* The audience delights in it, and no wonder: in appreciating the piece, the audience can congratulate its own as well as the play's smartness. It conjures up images of James Joyce, Lenin and the Dadaist Tristan Tzara, when in 1916 they all resided in Zurich. The medium for this evocation is Henry Carr, then English consular assis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tant, who is presumed to remember them in 1962. Joyce and Carr actually met in those days during World War I. Carr appeared in amateur performances of *The Importance of Being Earnest* which the writer—then at work on *Ulysses*—had arranged. Not only that, but each of the men brought suit against the other over a trivial sum of money. This is Carr's claim to fame—and also that he may in passing have encountered Lenin and Tzara in the library at Zurich.

What the play toys with is the contrast of the literary genius, the perverse aestheticism of the anti-poet Tzara, and the great Russian revolutionary. All this is supposedly seen and narrated in his dotage by Carr (played to a tee by John Wood), the testy codger who at his youthful best was a playful twerp of the British bureaucracy.

The show's pattern is intriguing, its writing extremely deft and highly amusing, its posture cagily on the side of "art" or the creation of masterpieces. The last lines of the text state as much of the author's conclusion as he will allow: "You're either a revolutionary or you're not, and if you're not you might as well be an artist as anything else. . . . If you can't be an artist, you might as well be a revolutionary. . . ."

Much of Pinter's early writing may be set down as moral parable about an amoral reality. Yet, for all its distortions, there is a weird clarity in the imagery. In *Old Times* Pinter's distorting mirror seems to be overlaid by a veil which causes one to doubt whether any reality exists at all. Many theatregoers, therefore, insist that the play is thoroughly unintelligible. They fail to recognize that this opinion arises not from the play's composition but from its very point: the medium, in this case, is the message.

Some find Pinter's new play, *No Man's Land*, just as or even more puzzling. It has been subject to the most fantastic, not to say idiotic, interpretations. If one is disposed, as I am, to take it almost literally, it is by no means as "difficult" as some would have it. It presents two writers who may have known each other in their nonage and who, now in their 60s, meet each other by chance. One of the men has become affluent and famous, the other has won little recognition; he is poor and looks rather the worse for wear. His attitude toward the luckier man appears deferential, but one perceives in his semi-servile stance a touch of superiority, an innuendo of vindictive malice.

The successful writer has become a drunk, lives in a constant alcoholic haze and is so often *non compos mentis* that he must be taken care of (in style) by two cockney servants—one of them a near thug, the other more slimy and with pretensions to an exotic worldliness. Both servants are peculiarly arrogant on account of their position in respect to their master's high estate while being half-consciously contemptuous of his present impotence. (One might think of these two rather sinister figures as agents, managers or sundry other such helpers who surround and run interference for moguls of the literary, entertainment and sport milieus.) The unsuccessful writer is treated by the servants as a shabby intruder who at any moment may be thrown out; they refrain from doing so because their distinguished boss not only tolerates the man but credits him with some vague authority.

There is a strange connection between the two writers. Is it possible that at some earlier period the "loser," as he avers, has had an affair with the wife of his opposite? This may only be a way of taunting his illustrious rival, but it does not prevent his offering to serve him in every respect.

The play is written with a glossy precision, giving it a fascinating surface (much of it has the odd clarity and inner chaos of a drunkard's dream). It is acted in the same manner by Ralph Richardson: elegant, frozen, luxuriously solid, starchily deft, disturbingly vacant; John Gielgud is frayed, pathetically injured, altogether plausible with that air of inexpugnable distinction so admirable in the English, especially in defeat. The production, perfectly set, beautifully lit, is staged as if it emerged directly out of the author's conception. With it all, there is something glacial in it, lending it both distance and an insidious intimacy.

Yet a question persists: we seize upon what is being shown, we are not sure what is being said. Characteristic of Pinter's art is his refusal to *say* anything—anything, that is, which may be readily formulated as a "position." The play, an emanation of the writer's troubled being, is projected in "detached" imagery. Like the unsuccessful writer (his conscience, his *alter ego*; the play may be auto-criticism, the two writers being one man "before and after"), Pinter is perhaps summing himself and his work up in its concluding lines: "You are in no man's land. Which never moves, which never changes, which never grows older, but which remains forever, icy and silent." To which the successful one's response is, "I'll drink to that."

If such be the case, I submit that while it is significant of Pinter's present spiritual condition and is to be assumed relevant only to that (for Pinter disclaims all concern with political or social issues), it may still be taken as an utterance which has its source in a society at a dead end, unable to move backward or forward. It finds an echo in the audience which applauds the play in the National Theatre at the Old Vic.

Now running to full houses (at the tiny Arts Theatre) is a play by the American Robert Patrick called *Kennedy's Children*. It is a quasi-documentary series of monologues by five young people gathered together at an East Village café-bar. The five personages never relate themselves to one another; each one speaks of his or her own experience of the 1960s.

One is a simple soldier on leave from Vietnam, torn by the tension between his innate gentleness and his "patriotic duty." Another is a teacher of retarded children; she reveres the memory of John and Robert Kennedy, whose assassination is for her the major tragedy of the generation. Still another is a girl who hoped to model her career on that of Marilyn Monroe but has been unable to find work except of the most sordid kind. "They used to laugh at Marilyn Monroe," the girl complains, "when she didn't want to be a sex-goddess, she wanted to be a human being. And now they laugh at me when I say I don't want to be a human being, I want to be a sex-goddess."

The most embittered person of all is a young woman who, besides having gone through the rituals of sex and drugs, also participated in demonstrations against all the iniquities of the time. "We've been marching since we were babies and all we did was to make Jane Fonda famous," she wails in rage. The whole youth movement (civil rights, anti-war, etc.) with its stirring beginnings seems to have gone for nothing and yet, heartbroken, she cries out, "But we did some good, we did."

There is also an Off-Off-Broadway actor who speaks of his hardships and humiliations, but his plight in the general context—especially a long recital of a sordid true-to-life episode in the history of

STEEL SCULPTURE

polished
wire, i
don't think i
could endure it
to have to be at
peace with that
cold art

---

i think
i could
be
one
with that
cold
art

Judith Johnson Sherwin

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

our underground theatre—seems wholly gratuitous and thus boring.

The *March of Time*—1961-62-63-64 and so on—aspect of the proceedings unnerved me so that I was tempted to leave the theatre after the first act. But I stayed on, held because as all the items—the murder of Martin Luther King, the killings at Kent State, etc.—were unfolded, I was gripped by a grave disquiet, historical as well as personal. Why, I asked myself, is there so little continuity in all the best impulses of American endeavor? Why are there only seasonal "trends" rather than a line of ever maturing, determined effort? Why is there no real growth? I watched *Kennedy's Children*—acted by an American and British cast—with antennae directed toward the audience. What, I asked myself, do they see in the play? Were they laughing at or feeling superior to the American mess and debacle or were they aware of a correspondence between the American situation and their own disillusionment? Certainly the show was not being received as ordinary stage entertainment. The ache and melancholy of the sorry chronicle were a present rebuke as well as a reminder. □

ART

LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

The history of 20th-century art has proved harder to write than was expected. Its internationalism makes it difficult, for instance, for French-based writers to do justice to Northern Expressionism or for Germans of Werner Haftmann's generation to cope with postwar American art. The command of Haftmann's chapters on European art, in his *Painting in the 20th Century,* slides into platitude when he writes about New York. The century's art history is fractured still more by the fact that painting and sculpture are chronicled separately: they lie side by side but untouching. Even when there is a chance to discuss the relation of painting and sculpture, as in the case of a sculptor like David Smith who had many connections to painters, the topic is not pressed: see Rosalind Krauss's *Terminal Iron Works* for an example. Contacts between these two aspects of the visual arts are treated like reckless interdisciplinary crossovers.

The narrowing of modern art history has had two bad effects. It has impoverished the interpretation of those artists it has favored and it has excluded the incompatible others. Max Kozloff proposed recently in his *Cubism—Futurism* interesting revisions of the standard interpretation of Picasso, for example. Discontent with an overemphasis on formal properties in the history of art can be seen, too, in the gradual pile up of monographs on American artists who are not given much space in recent history books. Thomas Hart Benton, Isabel Bishop and Reginald Marsh, for instance, used to be treated as merely what Abstract artists had to contend with, but they are now clearly visible in terms of their own personalities and characteristic work. Among realists, Edward Hopper and Ben Shahn have long been secure, but there are artists as good as Kenneth Hayes Miller and Philip Evergood who are still ignored.

What is likely to happen as more figurative artists become an acknowledged part of the history of 20th-century art? Probably the situation will resemble for a time the stand-off of painting and sculpture: there will be separate accounts, with readers left to make their own comparisons. No doubt synoptic works will appear, capacious enough to cover both modes, in a unified theory of art. In the meantime, it is worth maintaining the internationalism of art by reminding ourselves that the revisionist impulse is not only American. This summer the National Portrait Gallery, London, arranged two Augustus John exhibitions, one of documents at the Portrait Gallery and one of his art at 15 Carlton Terrace (until August 31). The director of the NPG suggests that "with the revival of interest in figurative art we can take a more sympathetic view of John."

I lived in London until 1961 and when I left it would have been inconceivable to me that I might take John seriously one day: it is a measure of the shift in taste that I am doing so now. He was born in 1873 and his early work is Baroque revival portraiture, with references to Hals (direct glance at the spectator), Rubens (ripeness of form), and Rembrandt (light forms against dark). That is to say, he was using the painterly possibilities of the grand manner to catch likenesses with heightened quirks of character and expression. However, the example of, presumably, Gauguin, Cézanne and Matisse led him to reject shadowy masses and to paint quite bright and definitely flat.

For about four years he painted Dorelia and their children in idealized landscape settings. He built up an iconography of gypsies, in free picturesque clothing, an outdoor version of W.B. Yeats's nostalgic Celticism. (John was Welsh.) The imagery parallels, though mildly, the sunbathing nudes in the Baltic of the German artists of *die Brücke.* Incidentally, the documentary exhibition gave ample photographic evidence of John's naturism; his children seem almost never to have been dressed. Malcolm Easton, in the catalogue, records that John met Picasso in 1907 and points out that "there resulted several canvases in the Blue and Rose manner." John was painting an imagery of free life, not the desolate freedom of Picasso's roving *saltimbanques,* but a kind of contented *vie de bohème.* He painted no men in these idylls, only possessive groupings of Dorelia and his children.

This lyrical period, a pastoral of male domination, was not maintained: he tried to use the imagery as the basis of large compositions but they were never finished. John then reappeared as a portrait painter with a fluent, brushy version of his earlier Baroque style. It is a high society manner, fully developed by 1919 in such portraits as those of Lady Ottoline Morrell and the Marchesa Casati. The Marchesa has red hair and heavy eye make-up, out of which she looks challengingly; she wears a negligee against the background of an Alpine storm. Instead of artist-centered reverie, John is producing vivid portraits that seek the individual likeness, as it is remade by hairdresser and couturier. It is the body as shaped by shared current fashion rather than as the container of a distraught psyche. This attitude goes against present expectations but the psychology of the pleasure of looking like other people is a real factor in the history of portraiture. There is a series of male portraits of, among others, T.E. Lawrence, Thomas Hardy, Joseph Hone, Dylan Thomas. They are in more sober style. Instead of flattering bravura, John treats the male countenance in ways that suggest moments of inspired abstraction, a worldly vagueness, as if each sitter were having great thoughts. An aristocracy of the (male) spirit is implied.

It is clear that it is easier at first to like John's work of 1910-14 than to admire the later ingratiating stereotypes. The early works have a flatness and solidity that is parallel to notions of what Modern art is supposed to look like. There is another, social, difficulty about appreciating John's later work. Our highly developed counter-snobbery makes it hard to see imagery like this without the trailing clouds of injustice. However, before dismissing him for male chauvinism or snobbery there may be work

Book Publishing
Manuscripts invited for prompt review and terms of publication. All subjects. Professional editing, design, production and marketing since 1920. Send inquiry or manuscript, or call (215) 563-3553. Ask for free *Authors' Guide* B-86.
DORRANCE & COMPANY
1617 J.F. Kennedy Blvd. Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

THE NATION'S BEST PUZZLES
by Frank Lewis
Unique collection of wit-warpers of Books 1, 2 and 3. Send $4.25 (postage prepaid) to:
E. S. Lewis
25 Hubinger Street
New Haven, Conn. 06511

ADVERTISE YOUR NEEDS IN THE NATION

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be done on, for example, the use made of Mannerism by 20th-century figure painters. Dorelia is a lanky, Diana-type, elongated beyond probability, and such 16th-century-derived distortions abound also in the rural subjects of Benton and John Steuart Curry. They did not influence one another but they all used the elongated figure proportions of 16th-century art. Why? How did Mannerism become associated with life in the country rather than in the courts where it started? Questions of this sort remain to be asked, let alone answered. The point is that the revival of recently disreputable artists requires the collection of new information if we are not to succumb to the inertia of earlier prejudice while giving it a new name. □

FILMS

E. BRADFORD BURNS

Buenos Aires

The new Argentine film *Los Gauchos Judios* (*The Jewish Gauchos*) opened to both public and critical acclaim in Buenos Aires, but not without a major cut by the erratic local censor and a bomb attack on the theatre where it was first shown. Its popular success testifies to its excellence and also to a recent boom in the Argentine movie industry. The nomination of *La Tregua* (*The Truce*) for an Oscar in April added international luster to the efforts of an industry which produces on average about forty films a year. Now, *Los Gauchos Judios* promises to break box office records for a national production. It is the third film by an able, young director, Juan José Jusid, whose *Tute Cabrero* (roughly translatable as *Each for Himself*) was a brilliant study of contemporary Argentine urban society.

Los Gauchos Judios is freely based on an impressionistic novel of the same name written in 1910 by Alberto Gerchunoff (1883-1949). As a youngster, he had been part of the swelling current of Russian Jews emigrating to the Argentine countryside. Settling later in Buenos Aires, he wrote this minor classic of Argentine literature, a tender reminiscence of the struggles and triumphs he had witnessed in those early Jewish settlements on the pampas. The book subsequently went through eight Argentine editions and three translations. However, in one week, probably more people saw the film than had read the book in sixty-five years.

E. Bradford Burns, professor of Latin American history at UCLA and author of Nationalism in Brazil (*Praeger*) *and* A History of Brazil (*Columbia University Press*), *travels widely in Latin America.*

The novel, which appeared in the year the Argentines celebrated a centenary of independence, appealed to nationalist sentiment, since it depicted the country as a haven for an oppressed people. Indeed, Argentina opened its doors to hundreds of thousands of European immigrants, among them the Russian Jews. They appreciated their new home, worked hard and prospered. Gerchunoff offered no systematic history of the Jewish rural settlements in the province of Entre Rios. Rather, his book evoked the past through varied vignettes. Beautifully written, the stories create an atmosphere of quiet triumph over adversity, of joy mixed with melancholy. He focused on the drama of the Jews' adaptation to a strange new land. Not surprisingly, the elderly tended to maintain their orthodoxy, while the young adapted more readily to the ways of the pampas. As Gerchunoff has one of the elders express it, "In Russia we lived badly, but we feared God and lived according to His Law. Here the young become gauchos." They put on the distinctive cowboy costume even before they could speak the language of the *paisanos*, those *mestizo* inhabitants of the pampas.

Although the sequences have been rearranged, the film remains faithful to the book. It opens with a powerfully emotional scene: as a train arrives in a forlorn rural station, its passengers, the newly arrived Jewish immigrants, survey their new home with eyes reflecting hope and joy mixed with fear and wonder. Other scenes of remarkable visual beauty and humaneness reflect the poetry which the novel exudes. At other times, however, the film forgoes the poetry for a more robust humor, part of which depends on caricature. Many of the elderly are exaggerated figures: rotund, boggle-eyed, verbose and given to animated gesticulating. They play their parts for laughs, and the audience willingly responds. They contrast with the young who are attractive, athletic, serious and romantic. More obviously perhaps than in the book, the New World triumphs as the young Jews, absorbed by their rural environment, adopt the way of life of the gaucho. If the Jews are astounded by some of the local customs they encounter, the *paisanos* are no less amazed by some of the Jewish rituals. One scene registers a *paisano*'s reaction to circumcision.

The colony has its adversities and certainly not all its members are prepared to confront the hardships and difficult labor. Assimilation is traumatic, even under the best circumstances. The film sweetens the process with some delightful music and a little dance, which at times seems to suggest a sort of Argentine *Fiddler on the Roof*. One of the film's songs has already risen to a "top-ten" spot in contemporary Argentine music. The reality doubtless was more rugged, as some events which accompanied the film's première might testify by extension.

Shortly before the opening, the local—and very active—censor intervened to slice a long scene from the film. The suppressed footage showed Gabriel, a young Jewish gaucho, forcing a *paisano* to confess a lie which had resulted in the tragic death of another *paisano*. The Argentine intellectual community protested the cut of that dramatic scene. The censor, who originally had announced the cut "for private and unlisted reasons," replied to the outcry by explaining that the scene did not faithfully reflect the Gerchunoff text. While the original passage is open to some interpretation, the censor's intervention marked the first and thus far only effort to require that screenplays adhere precisely to the books which inspired them. The film critic for the prestigious *La Opinion* noted, "Gabriel is a 'Jewish gaucho,' something which for the mentality of censorship probably does not authorize the courage which he shows in the film. It is typical of the criteria of censorship to suppose that vice and virtue, sin and defects have something to do with nationalities." The scene remains excised, but the controversy continues.

Censorship was not the only drama the film encountered. A bomb threat required the evacuation of the theatre, but proved to be a false alarm. However, when the show was about to begin again, an unidentified group in the house tore up some of the seats, broke the glass entry doors, and tossed three fire bombs into the lobby. Police units quickly extinguished the fire and arrested a few members of the gang. Thereafter, the police stood guard at each of the theatres showing the film. The incident indicated that the right-wing extremists responsible in the past for ugly anti-Semitic manifestations still lurk in the shadows of Argentine society. Also, the violence of contemporary Argentine society is aimed partly at the intellectuals and thus far has deprived the public of any Argentine plays of significant content, darkened movie screens, frightened artists into exile, and assassinated several prominent journalists.

Despite censorship and bombs—or perhaps because of them—the public flocks to see *Los Gauchos Judios*. Many of those in the audience are the sons, daughters and grandchildren of immigrants from every part of Europe, for Buenos Aires, now a city of more than 8 million inhabitants, grew largely as a result of immigration in the early decades of the century. No longer faced with the monumental problems of assimilation their ancestors confronted, they could reminisce by means of this delightful film about one of the most important events in modern Argentine history. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Crossword Puzzle No. 1595

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 In the way of the old spirit on personal call? (With a lot of reserve, you might not want it.) (8,6)
8 More commonly, being given a little bread? (9,3)
10 Not the Master of the Foxhounds—his trophy may be subsequently reduced. (4-6)
11 The first person to take quiet command, as a net result. (4)
13 One on a rostrum, alternatively on a mountain. (6)
14 Disturbed by the conflict, with no cure, it might seem. (8)
16 Taking your drawers off a wooden frame? Quite the opposite! (8)
17 Puts to the test, just as the fool is about to speak? (6)
19 Your name is probably a proper one. (4)
20 Literally, it's a thing to be remembered. (10)
22 It's not intended just to hold up your pants, though it might help in an emergency. (8,4)
23 Keep decent care of it, but you'll have to come first. (4,10)

DOWN

1 One might be a good inside fighter. (5-9)
2 A haven for the 14, in extreme cases. (6,6)
3 Slangy equivalent for mitts. (5,5)
4 Straightens out a sling shot. (6)
5 What does the poor French sailor have to complain about? (3-2-3)
6 You might file the digital type with "L," in a bunch of letters. (4)
7 Objective, for me? It's one possibility. (2,3,4,3,2)
9 One used to stick his arm out all the way for it. (4-4,4)
12 Broken dates—press not invited if you have this. (10)
15 Semi-circular canals might be found there. (5,3)
18 Such tales as *Frankenstein* might be obtained by the sound associated with an abundance of spirit. (6)
21 Your pipe isn't quite full, so how about a little cheese? (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1594

ACROSS: 1 Gone With the Wind; 9 Yardarm; 10 Karachi; 11 Evaded; 12 Affinity; 14 Acetic acid; 15 Menu; 17 and 4 Part time; 19 Anchorites; 22 Sideshow; 23 Unveil; 25 Atelier; 26 Hillock; 27 Three Men in a Boat. DOWN: 1 Guy de Maupassant; 2 Narrate; 3 Whale oil; 5 Take flight; 6 Earwig; 7 Incline; 8 Do-it-yourself kit; 13 Main course; 16 Prunella; 18 Red deer; 20 Tremolo; 21 Aspire; 24 Thai.

Readers are invited to send for a free copy of Mr. Lewis' "ground rules." Address Puzzle Department, *The Nation*, 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10014.

PUBLICATIONS

EDEN II, provocative science fiction by Edd Doerr. $1.95. Aquarius Press, 3018 Aquarius Ave., Silver Spring, Md. 20906.

'THE PRESS AND THE BAY OF PIGS'
A detailed study by
Victor Bernstein and Jesse Gordon
Single copies—15c; 25 copies at 10c each
Orders over 25 at 7c per copy
THE NATION
333 Sixth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10014

RECORDINGS

FREE 200-PAGE CATALOG. 1,400 New Stereo Recordings. Renaissance, Baroque, Classical, Romantic, Modern Music. Not sold in stores. Not listed in Schwann's. Highest quality! Budget label prices! Available only by mail. **MUSICAL HERITAGE SOCIETY, Box 932 NA, New York, N.Y. 10023.**

SERVICES

MOVING? Professional moving at competitive rates. Anytime, anywhere. Licensed, insured, experienced. **THE COVERED WAGON, ALgonquin 5-1788 (N.Y.C.)**

QUICK (BUT CAREFUL) MOVERS. Household or commercial. Realistic estimates. Reasonable rates. Insured. No job too small. **(212) 673-5341.**

PERSONALS

CONSIDERING A COMMUNE for retired long time readers of The Nation in 4-bedroom home in Colorado mountain valley. Any questions? **Box 66, Beulah, Colorado 81023.**

"SAVE THE ECONOMY: Trade in a Ford in '76" bumperstickers. $1.00; 3/$2.50. **G. P. O. Box 175-N, Chicopee, MA 01021.**

LEGALIZE ABORTION throughout Eurasia, the densely populated landmass. **Box 697, c/o The Nation.**

Buy Your Books
through THE NATION

Nation readers can avail themselves of our offer to send them any book published and delivered in the U.S. (except paperbacks) at the regular retail price postfree if payment is received with the order. When ordering, please give name and author and publisher, if possible.

Please address your orders to

THE NATION
READER'S SERVICE DIVISION
333 Sixth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10014

ADVERTISING RATES
Classified: $1.48 a line (6 words) 3 line min.
Classified Display: $14.84 per inch (min.)
THE NATION, 333 Sixth Ave., N.Y.C. 10014
242-8400

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



An invitation to celebrate The Nation's 110th birthday

The summer of 1975 marks our 110th birthday. While we are clearly a case of "survival of the fittest," it is you, the readers, who keep us going. Times have been good; times have been bad. Now they are very bad. The big magazines are fighting for their profits; The NATION is fighting for its life!

Here are eight (8) ways to sustain The NATION for another 110 years. Will you help?

1. Renew your present subscription regardless of expiration date. 1 year at $15.00; 2 years at $27.50. This represents a saving to you. as we must reluctantly raise our rates soon.

2. If you are not a subscriber, become one now. Try our Special Introductory Offer of 21 ISSUES FOR $7.50.

3. Contribute a tax-deductible gift of $10.00 to the Library Fund, enabling us to renew the subscription of a school or library left without funds. Smaller amounts are also welcome.

4. For $2.95, you can order a packet of the BEST OF 1974, the eight issues we believe to be last year's best. Articles by Robert Sherrill, Frank J. Donner, Penny Lernoux, Robert Hatch, Rep. Les Aspin and others will delight and amaze you as you read them today.

5. Join Nation Associates, that loyal cadre of NATION readers whose membership dues bridge the gap between income and expenses. $50.00 a year, which includes your annual subscription, goes a long way.

6. Give a Gift Subscription. Our Introductory Offer of 21 ISSUES FOR $7.50 makes The NATION a moderately-priced gift, ideal for any occasion.

7. For $4.95, order a handsome Library Case, large enough to hold one full year of The NATION.

8. Can you make a more substantial gift? Cash? Securities? Endowment? Bequest? Drop us a line for more information about legal and tax status.

Please indicate your choice by circling the appropriate number(s) at the left of the coupon below. And do act now.

CUT HERE

1 $_____
2 $_____
3 $_____
4 $_____
5 $_____
6 $_____
7 $_____
8 $_____

$_____ payment enclosed

Yes, I want to celebrate The NATION's 110th birthday, as shown at left.

name _____

address _____

city _____ state _____ zip _____

8-16-75

NATION 333 SIXTH AVE. NEW YORK, N.Y. 10014

Send a Gift Subscription 21 issues for $7.50

to:

name _____

address _____

city _____ state _____ zip _____

Include a Gift Card signed as follows:

_____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED